

**THE BALKANS: WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED;  
WHAT IS THE AGENDA FOR THE NEXT  
FIVE YEARS**

---

---

**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

—————  
JULY 11, 2001  
—————

**Serial No. 107-38**

—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



Available via the World Wide Web: [http://www.house.gov/international\\_relations](http://www.house.gov/international_relations)

—————  
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

73-776PS

WASHINGTON : 2001

---

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Internet: [bookstore.gpo.gov](http://bookstore.gpo.gov) Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250  
Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, *Chairman*

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York	TOM LANTOS, California
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa	HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska	GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey	ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DAN BURTON, Indiana	DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ELTON GALLEGLY, California	ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida	SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CASS BALENGER, North Carolina	CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia
DANA ROHRABACHER, California	EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California	BRAD SHERMAN, California
PETER T. KING, New York	ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio	JIM DAVIS, Florida
AMO HOUGHTON, New York	ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York	WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina	GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana	BARBARA LEE, California
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado	JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
RON PAUL, Texas	JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
NICK SMITH, Michigan	EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania	SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
DARRELL E. ISSA, California	GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia	ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona	DIANE E. WATSON, California
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana	
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia	

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., *Staff Director/General Counsel*

ROBERT R. KING, *Democratic Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, *Chairman*

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska	EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
PETER T. KING, New York	BRAD SHERMAN, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina	ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana	JIM DAVIS, Florida
NICK SMITH, Michigan	ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York	WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa	BARBARA LEE, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana	JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia	

VINCE MORELLI, *Subcommittee Staff Director*

PATRICK PRISCO, *Professional Staff Member*

KELLY McDONALD, *Staff Associate*

# CONTENTS

---

	Page
WITNESSES	
Assistant Secretary Beth Jones, Bureau of European Affairs, U.S. Department of State .....	7
Daniel P. Serwer, Ph.D., Director, Balkans Institute, United States Institute of Peace .....	29
James R. Hooper, Managing Director, Public International Law and Policy Group .....	37
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING	
The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe: Prepared statement .....	2
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .....	5
Assistant Secretary Beth Jones: Prepared statement .....	9
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York: Prepared statement .....	21
Daniel P. Serwer: Prepared statement .....	32
James R. Hooper: Prepared statement .....	40



## **THE BALKANS: WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED; WHAT IS THE AGENDA FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS**

**WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2001**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:35 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. GALLEGLY. We will call to order the Subcommittee on Europe.

Today, the Subcommittee continues its oversight of the European region by looking at what is perhaps the most vexing and problematic region in Europe, the Balkans.

It has been almost 6 years since the peace agreement known as the Dayton Accords helped end the fighting in Bosnia. It has been almost 2 years since the brutal tragedy of Kosovo ended.

Today, the one man most responsible for all of this is in prison in the Hague, awaiting trial. Yet, despite the ravages of war, the ethnic cleansing, the mass refugee flows, the economic devastation throughout the region, and the deployment of thousands of international peacekeepers, one is forced to ask, "are things really moving in the right direction?"

What are we to make of Macedonia? Can a new war be averted? With the elections coming soon in Kosovo and all the major Albanian political parties in favor of independence, how will the future of Kosovo be managed, and by whom?

Will Montenegro actually be allowed to go through with its own self-determination? Are the Dayton Accords really what is best for Bosnia; whose viability is in question when one looks deeply into the goals of those governing the Croat Federation or the Republika Srpska?

What has really been accomplished if everyone fears the removal of all or just some U.S. military forces from Bosnia or Kosovo?

Why is it that despite the fact that our European allies have a greater vested interest in a peaceful and prosperous Balkans and that most of the Balkan countries themselves wish to be part of the European Union, the U.S. is considered the only viable guarantor of the peace in the region?

What exactly are the benchmarks by which we measure success in the Balkans? And while we might agree with Secretary Powell

when he says, “we went in together and we will come out together,” does anyone have a clue as to when and under what circumstances we will be able to come out together?

The purpose of this hearing then is to assess the current situation throughout the Balkans, in an attempt to better appreciate what progress has actually been achieved to date, and to attempt to identify a set of strategies which will address the tough, unresolved issues facing us over the next several years.

We are pleased to have with us today several experts who hopefully can shed some light on these and other questions regarding the Balkans.

Before we turn to our first witnesses, I would like to introduce our new Ranking Member and good friend, Earl Hilliard, and ask if he would like to make an opening statement; Earl?

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

#### THE BALKANS

Today, the Subcommittee continues its oversight of the European region by looking at what is perhaps the most vexing and problematic region in Europe—the Balkans.

It has been almost six years since the peace agreement known as the Dayton Accords helped end the fighting in Bosnia.

It has been almost two years since the brutal tragedy of Kosovo ended. Today, the one man most responsible for all this is in prison in the Hague awaiting trial.

And yet, despite the ravages of war, the ethnic cleansing, the mass refugee flows, the economic devastation throughout the region, and the deployment of thousands of international peacekeepers, one is forced to ask “are things really moving in the right direction?”

- What are we to make of Macedonia? Can a new war be averted?
- With elections coming soon in Kosovo and all the major Albanian political parties in favor of independence, how will the future of Kosovo be managed? And by whom?
- Will Montenegro actually be allowed to go through with its own self-determination?
- Are the Dayton Accords really what is best for Bosnia, whose viability is in question when one looks deeply into the goals of those governing the Croat Federation or the Republica Serbska?
- What has really been accomplished if everyone fears the removal of all or just some U.S. military forces from Bosnia or Kosovo?
- Why is it that despite the fact that our European allies have a greater vested interest in a peaceful and prosperous Balkans and that most of the Balkan countries themselves wish to be part of the European Union, the U.S. is considered the only viable guarantor of the peace in the region?
- What exactly are the benchmarks by which we measure success in the Balkans?
- And while we might agree with Secretary Powell when he says “we went in together and we will come out together”—does anyone have a clue as to when and under what circumstances we *can* come out together?

The purpose of this hearing then is to assess the current situation throughout the Balkans in an attempt to better appreciate what progress has actually been achieved to date and to attempt to identify a set of strategies which will address the tough, unresolved issues facing us over the next several years.

We are pleased to have with us today several experts who hopefully can shed some light on these and other questions regarding the Balkans.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very happy to serve on this Subcommittee.

Let me express my thanks to you for holding this hearing and for the warm reception that you have given me, since I have become Ranking Member on this Committee. I also wish to convey my enthusiasm and excitement for having the opportunity to serve as Ranking Member on this Subcommittee.

The policies and decision-making process and the hearings held by this Subcommittee, I know, will have a profound impact on the welfare of millions. The challenges and conflicts on the European continent set a precedent for the international community, as we learn to deal with the global economy and rapid shifts in political regimes.

Yesterday, international disputes were fought between independent sovereign states. Today, most disputes exist within states, and the violence that they create often harms more civilians than soldiers. The challenges which lie before us are without precedent, and old solutions may not be used for new struggles.

Despite our struggle with new, unknown elements or political religions in military conflicts, I still have great hope for our future. Where there is ambiguity, we can create structure. Where there is confusion, I hope that through this process we can find meaning.

European history has been full of strife. Yet, Europeans have turned problems into promises by becoming pioneers. They have forged economic, political, and cultural links among themselves, unlike any other type of organization on this earth.

These are very courageous steps, because it brings together many different countries, even different languages, and a large number of various cultural ties.

It is my hope that the United States Government will do what it can to support their efforts, because their efforts, if they are successful, will become a model for our world.

A world without boundaries may be a dream for some, but the roots of anxiety and fear for others. There are many problems that we must overcome, and we must do it by helping one another.

So I am very happy, Mr. Chairman, that you have called this timely hearing on the questions before us and the situations that stand, to deal with this hearing.

I will watch with great anticipation to see how Europe faces new challenges, and the interaction between Europe in solving its problems in America.

I look forward with great interest to the testimony of our distinguished guests and their recommendations for dealing with the circumstances that are currently existing in the Balkans. Thank you for your time and consideration on this important matter.

Mr. Chairman, once again, I would like to reiterate my thanks for the warm reception that you have given me, since I have become Ranking Member on this Subcommittee.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Earl. As I mentioned earlier, your predecessor, Mr. Hastings, and I had a wonderful working relationship. I look forward to the same type of relationship, as we move on this.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. This is a very important Committee, and I appreciate your comments.

We have one more brief statement by the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and for allowing me to sit on the panel.

Yesterday, along with several of our colleagues, I returned from attending the annual session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, which met in Paris. We had the opportunity to meet with NATO's Supreme Allied Commander and Commander of the U.S. Force in Europe, General Joseph Ralston, at the beginning of the conference in Normandy.

It was an honor to join him and several other Members, including Ben Nighthorse Campbell, in laying a wreath at the American cemetery. Afterwards, we had a very significant, I think, briefing and Q & A about what can be done with regards to Bosnia.

The point that was made by General Ralston was that while we had significantly reduced the force levels in Bosnia, making further force reductions or returning Bosnia to a point of self-governance would require that certain fundamental changes are made on the ground.

I completely agree with the General that any sense of strategy for the international military forces must include the re-establishment of civil institutions and the rule of law. One of the General's suggestions was the establishment of a police training school in Bosnia, which would be akin to what we have going on right now in Kosovo.

Recent events in Bosnia argue very, very persuasively for greater police training. For example, the attacks in May on those seeking to rebuild destroyed mosques in Banja Luka and Trebinje happened, in large part, because police seemed to be unable to control the situation, and even seemed to interact with the attackers, rather than to enforce the law and to protect visiting dignitaries.

Another example were the attacks in Mostar and elsewhere last April, when the international community seized the records of a Bosnian-Croat bank, used by organized criminal networks in the region.

The SFOR peacekeepers, consisting of military units, were clearly unable to deal with the confrontation, in which civilians were involved, and included the use of women and children as shields while international personnel were attacked, and in some cases seriously hurt.

Some countries have military units designed to deal with crowd control in civilian confrontations; others do not. Meanwhile, the international police force in Bosnia, run by the U.N. has a mandate limited mostly to monitoring.

Ultimately, and this has been made very clear through ongoing monitoring by the Helsinki Commission, the police training in Kosovo has done an excellent job in building a professional police service, dedicated to protecting people, rather than attacking them.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that a letter that General Ralston sent on July 5th to me about this need, and to other members of our commission, be made a part of the record, because he makes it so clear that if we want to get out of Bosnia any time soon, there has to be a viable, on-the-ground, professionally trained police

force. Kosovo is the example, that we have to, I think, move with dispatch on doing likewise in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

So I would ask that this be made a part of the record, and hopefully, we can move forward with that proposal.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith and the information referred to follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A  
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Yesterday, along with several of our colleagues, I returned from attending the annual session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly which met in Paris. We had the opportunity to meet with NATO's Supreme Allied Commander and Commander of U.S. Force in Europe, General Joseph Ralston, in Normandy. I was honored to join him and Senator Campbell, and our other colleagues in laying a wreath at the American Cemetery, and giving our respect to the Allied forces who lost their lives in the D-Day invasion.

Of course, the situation in the Balkans was a major topic in the briefing.

The point made by General Ralston was that while we have significantly reduced the force levels in Bosnia, making further force reduction or returning Bosnia to a point of self-governance would require that certain fundamental changes are made on the ground. I completely agree with the General that any sensible exit strategy for the international military forces must include the re-establishment of civil institutions and the rule of law. One of the General's suggestions was the establishment of a police training school in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This struck me as an excellent idea.

Recent events in Bosnia argue for greater police training. For example, the attacks in May on those seeking to rebuild destroyed mosques in Banja Luka and Trebinje happened in large part because police seem unable to control the situation and even seemed to interact with the attackers rather than enforce the law and protect visiting dignitaries.

Another example were the attacks in Mostar and elsewhere last April when the international community seized the records of a Bosnian Croat bank used by organized criminal networks in the region. The SFOR peacekeepers, consisting of military units, were clearly unable to deal with a confrontation in which civilians were involved and included the use of women and children as shields while international personnel were attacked and, in some cases, seriously injured.

Some countries have military units designed to deal with crowd control and civilian confrontations; others do not. Meanwhile the International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, run by the United Nations, has a mandate limited mostly to monitoring.

Alternatively, police training in Kosovo, run by the OSCE, has done an excellent job in building a professional police service, dedicated to protecting people rather than attacking them. Similarly, the OSCE is involved in police training in southern Serbia, hoping to build trust and cooperation between the new Serbian authorities and the local Albanian population. The Paris Declaration which was agreed to by the OSCE PA yesterday included language which I had offered noting the increased role the OSCE is playing in the provision of training to police cadets in countries which are undergoing democracy transformation.

Obviously there is a difference in the law enforcement structures in Bosnia and Kosovo. The point made by General Ralston is that the costs associated with training and fielding police officers is a fraction of the costs of maintaining the international military presence currently deployed in the Balkans.

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND,  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF,  
*July 6, 2001.*

Hon. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH  
*U.S. House of Representatives,*  
*Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I enjoyed the opportunity to exchange views with you yesterday at the Normandy American Cemetery. Per your request, I am providing a follow-up on my perspective concerning the potential for future progress in the Balkans. As I mentioned yesterday, we have made significant progress in reducing

American troop levels in Bosnia, but I do not believe that we will be able to make further force reductions, or reach the point where we can return Bosnia to a point of self-governance, without making some fundamental changes to the way we are currently conducting business there.

Any exit strategy for the international forces located in both Bosnia and Kosovo, must begin with re-establishing the rule of law and creating the civil institutions necessary to make and uphold the rule of law. In Kosovo, thanks to the recognized leadership of a single entity, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), we have made measurable progress in this area in a relatively short period of time. This progress has been made in spite of the fact that we do not have a political framework in Kosovo as we do in Bosnia. The U.N. has published more than 100 regulations with the force of law. They have also appointed more than 400 local judges and prosecutors, with five district courts and some lower courts, in operation. Additionally, ten international judges and five international prosecutors have been appointed to the district courts, and an international judge now sits on the Supreme Court.

Another success story in Kosovo is the UNMIK police operation. UNMIK's 4,384 man strong police contract force, complemented by new officers trained in the OSCE's Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS), is the only law enforcement unit recognized in Kosovo. As one of the pillars of the UNMIK strategy in the province, the OSCE is working to produce enough trained, indigenous, multi-ethnic officers to eventually replace the U.N. contract force that currently maintains law and order. I strongly encourage you to visit this school. The KPSS graduated its 15th class on 12 May, essentially achieving its mandated goal of placing 4,000 new officers on the beat since opening its doors in September 1999. This effort has been so successful that the school's mission has been extended to produce at least two additional classes, of 600 officers, and indications are the effort will be expanded to train and supervise another 4,000 officers. The KPSS is a tangible first step toward transferring the internal security of Kosovo back to civilian authority where it belongs.

While we have a political framework in Bosnia (the Dayton Accords), the situation there is complicated by an ethnic reality that has three highly dispersed and intermingled groups with few agenda items in common. As a result, the indigenous police forces in Bosnia have, in many ways, remained separate and ineffective fiefdoms. This stands in stark contrast to the successful UNMIK and OSCE cooperative law enforcement effort in Kosovo. Despite the presence of over 2,000 U.N. International Police Task Force (IPTF) monitors in Bosnia, the existing police and state border services there continue to be ineffective against organized crime. There is no effective means in place to recruit new officers and imbue them with a respect for the rule of law. As a result, organized crime in Bosnia continues to threaten its political and economic future.

In short, Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe that we need to reexamine the law enforcement structures currently in place in Bosnia and reorganize to facilitate reestablishing of the rule of law there. The cooperative UNMIK and OSCE effort in Kosovo should serve as a model in this effort. The costs associated with training and fielding police officers from the indigenous populace is miniscule when compared to the costs of maintaining the international military presence currently deployed to the Balkans. If Bosnia is to ever stand on its own, we must set the conditions for economic success. This success is dependent upon capital investment (both fiscal and human), and capital investment will not occur in an area threatened by crime and corruption and characterized by a vacuum in the rule of law.

I hope you find this perspective useful as you continue your efforts both in the OSCE and on Capitol Hill. Should the USEUCOM staff or I be of any further service to you, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH W. RALSTON,  
*General, USAF.*

Mr. GALLEGLY. I am very pleased today to welcome Secretary Jones, who is making her first appearance before the House International Relations Committee, at least in her new capacity.

We welcome you, Ambassador. We wish you well in your new position. We look forward to working with you on this and other issues regarding United States and European relations. Welcome, Madam Secretary.

**STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY BETH JONES,  
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Secretary JONES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you also for your very warm welcome to me here. I very much look forward to working with you on, as you mentioned, some extremely important issues between the United States and Europe.

I am very pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Balkans. As you have said, and as Congressman Smith and Congressman Hilliard have said, it is an extremely important issue for us.

I would like to talk in particular about what has been accomplished and what the agenda is for the next few years. With your permission, I would like to summarize my formal remarks, which I hope you will agree can be entered into the record.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection, we will put your entire statement in the record.

Secretary JONES. Thank you very much.

Our overall strategy for the Balkans is to work with our allies to secure peace and stability for a region that should part of a Europe, whole, free, and at peace. Our goal is for Southeast Europe to become a region of stable democracies, and for it to join the European mainstream.

To facilitate this, we are focusing on promoting democratic governance, based on the rule of law in civil society, assisting with economic reform, leading to sustainable growth, and advancing integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

We are making progress. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has transferred Milosevic to the Hague; Kosovo will have its first province-wide democratic elections in November; Bosnia continues to make progress in building democratic institutions; Albania and Bulgaria have recently concluded democratic elections; and Croatia is becoming a model for democratic reform. With international help, Macedonia continues to rely on democratic institutions to confront a violent insurgency and to pursue political reform.

The June 28 transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague was a success for close, bipartisan cooperation between Congress and the Administration, within the framework of the Congressional certification requirement in the Foreign Operations Bill.

Most of all, it was a success for the people of Yugoslavia and their democratically elected representatives in Belgrade. They confronted the deeds of the Milosevic government by fulfilling their obligations to the United Nations.

Belgrade has responded positively to difficult challenges in southern Serbia and Montenegro, as well, where the governments pursue dialogue in their efforts to find political solutions. Montenegro is making progress on implementing economic and political reform.

Croatia has emerged as a responsible, stabilizing force in Bosnia. Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY Tribunal in the Hague has significantly improved, and we will work to ensure that this continues.

Unique opportunities in Bosnia have been afforded by the willingness of democratic governments in Belgrade and Zagreb to be partners and not adversaries in the region. Peace, refugee returns,

and governments committed to multi-ethnic democracy have increased stability, resulting in a reduced SFOR.

Mr. Chairman, I understand that earlier today, you met with the standard bearer of Bosnia multi-ethnic democracy, Foreign Minister Lagumdzija, who is now in line to be Prime Minister.

In Kosovo, we have made great progress since NATO troops first entered the province 2 years ago. We are working to enhance stability in Kosovo by developing democracy and reducing threats from extremists. As Kosovo moves toward provincial assembly elections in November, recent elections in Albania and Bulgaria reaffirm the validity of the pursuit of democratic institutions.

The challenges remain. In Macedonia, a violent insurgency is destabilizing a country that has experienced 10 years of democratic multi-ethnic governance. We are working with our allies to put Macedonia back on the path of democratic development and Euro-Atlantic integration.

This will require political reforms that are significant, but achievable within Macedonia's democratic political process.

Ambassador Pardew, my Senior Advisor for Southeast Europe, is working closely and effectively with EU Envoy Leotard to bring the political parties in Macedonia to closure on a set of reforms.

Once a political agreement is in place, NATO has agreed to supervise the collection of weapons from the insurgents. There is a general, open-ended, unconditional cease-fire, brokered by a NATO team.

Political negotiations between the parties are delicate, but progressing. President Trajkowski and all of the parties have agreed to use an EU/U.S. draft framework paper, tabled July 7, as the way forward. The parties are engaging constructively on details, including on constitutional changes.

In Kosovo, we are actively working to reduce the threat that the violent extremist minority poses to the moderate majority. The flow of weapons, personnel, and supplies to insurgents in Macedonia and their criminal support networks has been reduced by UNMIK and KFOR.

President Bush also approved a visa ban and financial restrictions aimed at individuals and groups who promote extremist violence, or who otherwise undermine peace and stability in the western Balkans.

There are other challenges facing the region, as well. Economic restructuring and reform in Yugoslavia, the reduction and streamlining of the internal presence in Bosnia, and the arrest of remaining war criminals will require resolve, commitment, and support from the international community.

To support the Administration's strategy in Southeast Europe, the President has requested \$605 million for assistance, as well as \$169 million for U.N.-assessed peacekeeping costs for the region. Appropriation of these funds will provide a critical component of the international donor effort under way.

We are not in this alone. We expect our European and other partners to more than double our contribution. We are working hard to ensure appropriate burden sharing, with considerable success at the recent donor's conference. Of the \$1.28 billion pledged by donors, the U.S. contribution was 14 percent of the total.

The military component of engagement in the Balkans is shared with our allies, as well. The U.S. has 18 percent of SFOR's deployment, and KFOR is consistently 13 to 14 percent.

With U.S. support, allies will also provide the bulk of the 3,000 troops to carry out operation "Essential Harvest" in Macedonia, to assist in the consensual disarmament of the National Liberation Army, in the context of a cease-fire and a general political settlement.

Cooperation with our allies is imperative if we are to succeed. I do believe the day will come when all of these countries are self-sustaining within the critical support network of EU and NATO membership.

Our goal in helping the Balkans achieve peace and stability has been critical. While the Europeans have contributed in a significant way, U.S. involvement is critical, as demonstrated by our success in encouraging the Serbian Government to transfer Milosevic to the Hague, and the growing cooperation on the issue of war crimes throughout the region.

Mr. Chairman, we want to work ourselves out of a job; a progress that has begun in Bosnia. Today, the 11th of July marks the sixth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, the site of the worst massacre in Europe since World War II. The ceremony commemorating the event was peaceful.

Yes, the situation in the Balkans remains complex, and will take considerable energy and effort to resolve. But when we compare where we were 6 years ago to where we are right now, I say we are on the right road.

Thank you very much. I will be pleased to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY BETH JONES, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Balkans, in particular what has been accomplished, and what the agenda is for the next five years.

Our overall strategy for the Balkans is to work with our allies to secure peace and stability for a region that should be part of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Our goal is to bring Southeast Europe into the European mainstream, and while many challenges remain, there is increasing evidence of progress. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has transferred Milosevic to The Hague; Kosovo will have its first province-wide democratic elections in November; Bosnia continues to make progress in building democratic institutions; Albania and Bulgaria have recently concluded democratic elections; and Croatia is becoming a model for democratic reform. With international help, Macedonia continues to rely on democratic institutions to confront a violent insurgency and pursue political reform.

The June 28 transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague was a success for close, bipartisan cooperation between Congress and the Administration. Most of all, it was a success for the people of Yugoslavia and their democratically elected representatives in Belgrade in confronting the deeds of the Milosevic government by fulfilling the obligations to the UN. Only one year ago, Milosevic was firmly in power as President of Yugoslavia with no prospect he would be in The Hague today. Belgrade's political leadership is working through the aftermath of the Milosevic transfer through dialogue, within the framework of the constitution. We and our European allies will stay engaged to ensure that the positive steps undertaken by the new government continue.

Politically, Belgrade has responded positively to difficult challenges, illustrating a stark change since Milosevic's time when his response to political challenges was violence and repression. In southern Serbia, the government repudiated a military option, and instead worked closely with the international community to pursue dialogue with the local community and seek a political solution that addressed legiti-

mate minority grievances. They were assisted in these efforts by the OSCE, which has been training a multi-ethnic police force there. Belgrade authorities have also remained committed to dialogue with Montenegro, and have agreed to accept a democratic solution to their differences.

Serbia's sister republic, Montenegro, continues to make progress on implementing economic and political reforms. We continue to support a democratic and prosperous Montenegro within a reformed, democratic and prosperous Yugoslavia. Elections in April underscored that there is no strong consensus favoring independence. We firmly believe that the future relationship of Serbia and Montenegro must be decided through dialogue, and discourage both sides from taking unilateral actions that might prejudice such talks.

Croatia has emerged as a responsible, stabilizing force in the Balkans over the past 18 months. Croatia has joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program, the World Trade Organization, has signed a Stability and Association Agreement with the EU in preparation for eventual membership, and shares our approach on most regional issues. Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY has significantly improved, and we will work to ensure it continues to evolve in a positive direction.

The democratic governments in Belgrade and Zagreb have expressed willingness to be partners and not adversaries in the region, providing unique opportunities in Bosnia. Since the Dayton Accords were signed in late 1995, we have accomplished a great deal in Bosnia. Bosnia is at peace and its basic infrastructure has been rebuilt. Refugee returns, which reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing, have surged since 1998. For the first time since the end of the war, there are governments in place at the state level and in the entities committed to building a multiethnic democracy. Hardliners seeking to obstruct progress seem to be in retreat. In response to the growing stability in Bosnia, we have been able to reduce the size of SFOR. These changes provide the international community with its best opportunity yet to implement Dayton and move Bosnia toward Europe.

In Kosovo, we have made great progress since NATO troops first entered the province in June 1999. Economic and political development have now overtaken the urgent humanitarian needs that faced the international community when hundreds of thousands of refugees first returned and faced the reality of destroyed homes and businesses. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is steadily fulfilling its mandate under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo.

We have seen over the past few months that Kosovo's stability is a vital element of regional security. Through UNMIK and KFOR, we are working to enhance stability in Kosovo by developing democracy and reducing threats from extremists. We are building momentum in the development of democracy, which will enter a new phase with elections for a provincial assembly on November 17, 2001. These elections build upon the process that began with municipal elections in October 2000. We are working with the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to make the November elections as inclusive as possible, so that minorities have a place and a stake in Kosovo's future. The change in regime in Belgrade has made the registration of Serb internally displaced persons (IDPs) possible, and Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo are registering as well.

Peaceful and democratic elections are a good test of democracy's sway. Albania and Bulgaria just had elections which reaffirmed these countries' pursuit of democratic institutions. Albania's parliamentary elections concluded this past weekend were another step forward in the democratic development of that country. Bulgaria remains politically and economically stable and a relative model of ethnic tolerance. Parliamentary elections on June 17 ushered the new party of former King Simeon into power, and he has pledged continuity in Bulgaria's vigorous pursuit of joining the Euro-Atlantic mainstream.

Despite strong evidence of positive trends, challenges remain. We are working with our allies to overcome them. In Macedonia, a violent insurgency seeks to destabilize a country that has experienced ten years of democratic, multi-ethnic governance. Our goal is to help put Macedonia back on the path of democratic development and Euro-Atlantic integration. This will require political reforms that are significant but achievable within Macedonia's democratic political process. Ambassador James Pardew, my Senior Advisor for the Balkans, is working closely and effectively with EU Envoy Leotard to bring the political parties in Macedonia to closure on a set of reforms. Once a political agreement is in place, NATO has agreed to supervise the disarmament of the insurgents.

While one Balkan conflict may sound like another, Macedonia is quite different from Bosnia or Kosovo, neither of which had a multi-ethnic democratic base upon which to build. We anticipate that addressing the political demands of ethnic Alba-

nians in Macedonia should therefore not require an international civilian authority and long-term military presence. As Secretary Powell said when he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month, "we and our European partners know that we must do all we can to help the Macedonian people avoid the same tragedy of violence and warfare that has afflicted so many of their neighbors in Southeast Europe."

Yugoslav authorities will need resolve, a long-term commitment, as well as the support of the international community to face the challenges of an economy wrecked by a decade of war, misuse of state funds, corruption and lack of investment. Despite a successful donors conference, IMF and World Bank projections indicate that Yugoslavia will require more than a decade to recover from the disastrous decade of Milosevic's rule. Our goal is to work with our European allies to ensure that Yugoslavia makes steady economic progress, attracts foreign direct investment and improves the livelihood of its citizens.

While we have accomplished a great deal since the signing of the Dayton Accords, much remains to be done in Bosnia. The economy is still in a state of transition to a market economy. The moderate Alliance for Change coalition is fragile, and needs support. In the Federation, the government has had to face down a hostile Croat separatist movement. To accomplish our goals for self-sustaining democracy in Bosnia, we must continue to fuel the return process, while promoting economic reform, the rule of law and the apprehension of war criminals.

In Kosovo, we are actively working on ways to reduce the threat that the violent extremist minority poses to the moderate majority. U.S. and other KFOR troops have been increasingly effective at interdicting the flow of weapons, personnel, and supplies to insurgents in Macedonia and their criminal support networks. UNMIK has enacted a series of regulations that permit criminal proceedings against extremists, while the UNMIK police have succeeded in seizing weapons and persons involved in these activities. Two measures approved by the President were implemented on June 27 against individuals and groups who promote extremist violence or who otherwise undermine peace and stability in the Western Balkans. These measures not only provide a tool for undermining extremism, they also assist political moderates in Kosovo by allowing them to disassociate themselves from destructive radical elements now labeled as such by the United States. With UNMIK and OSCE, we are also helping to build a new, professional Kosovo Police Service, which now numbers over 3,800 officers. As we move forward in Kosovo, we will continue these efforts to ensure stability and security in the context of UNSCR 1244.

Our goal is for the Balkans to become a region of stable democracies that participate fully in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Southeast Europe is working towards joining the European mainstream. We are helping to facilitate this, focusing on: promoting democratic governance based on the rule of law and civil society; assisting with economic reform leading to sustainable growth; and advancing integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Bilaterally and through multilateral mechanisms, we are working to promote cooperation across borders. To support the administration's strategy, the President has requested \$605 million for FY 2002 assistance, as well as \$169.6 million for UN assessed peacekeeping costs for the region. Appropriation of these funds will provide a critical component of the international donor effort underway.

We expect our European and other partners to more than double our contribution. We are working hard to ensure appropriate burdensharing, and have had considerable success, as evidenced by the recent donors' conference for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: of the \$1.28 billion pledged by donors, the U.S. contribution amounted to \$181.6 million or 14 percent of the total.

The military component of engagement in the Balkans has been shared with our allies as well. Currently the U.S. share of SFOR's deployment of around 20,000 is approximately 18 percent, and our contribution to KFOR is consistently 13-14 percent of the total force. Allies will also provide the bulk of the 3,000 soldier complement to carry out operation "Essential Harvest" in Macedonia to assist in the consensual disarmament of the National Liberation Army (NLA) in the context of a cease-fire and a general political settlement. The U.S. will support this mission with logistics, medical assistance, transport (helicopters), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Our role in helping the Balkans achieve peace and stability has been critical. While the Europeans have contributed in a significant way, only the U.S. has the ability to deliver on major issues, as exemplified by our success in encouraging the Serbian government to transfer Milosevic to The Hague and the growing cooperation on the issue of war crimes throughout the region.

We intend to continue our strategy over the next five years, and this administration will be looking for a continuation of the trend of improvement. As President

Bush told the Europeans, "We went into the Balkans together and we will come out together, and our goal must be to hasten the arrival of that day when we can all come out together."

Our ultimate goal is to work ourselves out of a job in the Balkans, relying on democratic institutions and free markets as the foundations of stability. In the face of challenges we are making considerable progress. Yet none of these countries can be expected to maintain this path and contribute to European security without a real prospect of membership in Europe's premier economic and security institutions, the EU and NATO. Cooperation with our allies is imperative to achieve the lasting success which this region has shown increasing evidence of being capable. I do believe the day will come when all of these countries are self-sustaining within the critical support network of EU and NATO membership, on which the U.S., Central and Western Europe have come to rely.

Mr. Chairman, the 11th of July marks the sixth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, when thousands of unarmed men and boys were brutally slaughtered in one of the worst war crimes to occur in Europe since World War two. Yes, the situation in the Balkans remains complex and will take considerable energy and effort to solve, but when we compare where we were this time six years ago to where we are now, I can say we are on the right road.

This concludes my statement. I will be pleased to respond to the Committee's questions.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.

I would just like to start by asking a couple questions. In Bosnia today, we have essentially three governments where the most power seems to be inside the Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska.

We have three armies, all positioned pretty much against each other. We have three police forces, none of which seem to be capable of enforcing the rule of law; and there are three intelligence services, probably spying on each other. We have a weak constitutional court, and the three ethnic groups still seem to be pretty much separated.

Given this circumstance, would you say that a best case scenario would be that the stability and progress in the region may be a mile wide but only an inch deep?

Secretary JONES. No, I actually do not agree with that. We have been very encouraged by the progress that has been made under the new coalition government that has been in place for 9 months. We were impressed by the vision of Mr. Lagumdžija, when the Secretary spoke with him a couple of days ago. I know you had a chance to speak with him today.

There is no question that integration of all of the structures that you mentioned is critical to the success of the establishment and development of democratic institutions in Bosnia. A lot more work needs to be done, but certainly the effort that has been underway, under the coalition government, gives us hope that this will be possible.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I hope you are right.

Just this morning, I received a letter from the Acting Director of the Peace Corps., saying that due to a rise in anti-American sentiment in Macedonia, the Peace Corps. was suspending its program there.

What is your assessment of the current view of the U.S. inside Macedonia, and are we being perceived as favoring one side or the other?

Secretary JONES. Certainly, the security situation for Americans inside Macedonia is difficult. We have an advisory out to all Ameri-

cans in Macedonia. We have our own staff under authorized departure, which allows people to leave, who feel that they are not safe.

The Peace Corps., in the context of the issuance of the authorized departure, decided to pull their volunteers out, because it was too difficult for them to continue their mission in Macedonia. We are, of course, very hopeful that they will be able to come back, once the political settlement is in place, on which Mr. Leotard and Ambassador Pardew are working very hard.

We are certainly working extremely hard with all of the parties in Macedonia, with all of the members of the unity government, to accomplish a political settlement that takes into consideration the concerns of all ethnic groups in Macedonia, and that allows the democratically elected government to pursue economic prosperity for the country, and to put aside the divisions that have plagued it over the last few months.

Mr. GALLEGLY. But again, the perception; are we perceived as favoring one side or the other?

Secretary JONES. Certainly, there are some who believe that we favor one side or another. We absolutely do not favor one over another. We are squarely on the side of political reform, of establishment of democratic principles. That is why the President and Secretary Powell have been very active in pursuing a political agreement.

For instance, we were extremely pleased when the European Union High Representative, Mr. Solana, sent a personal representative to stay on the ground full-time in Macedonia, to work with the parties to bring them to agreement on a framework agreement. That is why they asked my advisor for the Balkans to go and work side by side with him, which he has been doing now for almost 2 weeks.

They are making progress. It is hard to see it maybe on a daily basis, but they have hour to hour discussions with each member of the unity government.

The compromises will be difficult, but the compromises that we are pressing all sides for are reasonable compromises, and we are very hopeful that the sides will be able to see that the only future for Macedonia is in a peaceful, political settlement. There is no future for Macedonia in a military settlement.

Mr. GALLEGLY. But you do not see a significant or universal perception of the U.S. as favoring one side or the other? Although there are obviously some that feel that way, no matter what. But it is not a significant or a strong feeling to that effect?

Secretary JONES. I do not think there is a very strong feeling to that effect. Certainly, there are plenty who think that we are on one side or the other. That is probably part of the nature of the effort that we have underway to force a compromise or to pursue a compromise. The mediators or the negotiators always seem to be on the wrong side of a compromise.

One of the things that I think was very important in helping the political leadership in Macedonia and elsewhere in the region to understand just how strongly the United States felt against extremism was when the President issued an Executive Order, not very long ago, a couple of weeks ago, that banned the travel of Albanian

extremists to the United States, and banned the provision of financial support to extremists in the region in Albania or Macedonia.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.

Mr. Hilliard?

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary, for commenting and sharing your views and that of the Administration with this Committee.

There are three areas that I am interested in. The first one deals with the high unemployment rate in Macedonia, as well as the other parts of the Balkans.

You know, immediately after any conflict, the idea is to get the people back to normalization as soon as possible. But when you have a large number of people unemployed with nothing to do, it sort of breeds discord.

As we understand it, there are some inter-ethnic conflicts and some religious conflicts over jobs. Is there any type of program in place that the Administration is pushing, or do you have any plans to help solve this problem?

Secretary JONES. Congressman, we completely agree with you that a great focus of our efforts in our assistance programs should be on economic reform and economic stability in all of these regions, not just in southeast Europe. Many of our programs are focused on exactly that kind of thing.

I would be pleased to provide details. I do not have the details in front of me as to which programs exactly we support. But it is very much a focus of U.S. policy and U.S. assistance to pursue economic reform and economic benefits and prosperity in these countries, for exactly the reasons that you enunciate.

Mr. HILLIARD. All right, and I also just want to indicate that a military solution is irrelevant, immaterial, probably would not be successful unless you have economic reform following it; and generally, they go hand in hand, if they are going to be successful.

Do you think that the trial of Milosevic, or not the trial, but just his incarceration, is going to increase the tension between the feelings of those persons in the Balkans against Americans; and have you taken any type of security precaution to make sure that those ill feelings are not translated into violence?

Secretary JONES. On the contrary, the transfer of Milosevic to the Hague had really an electrifying effect, we thought, throughout the entire region, in terms of removing an impediment to progress, to democratic progress in the region; and it certainly encouraged other countries, other entities, to pursue their own cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.

At the time of the transfer, when we knew the transfer was underway, we were certainly extremely focused on the security of our people in Belgrade and elsewhere in the country. Our Embassy was very focused on it, and we had hour by hour reports to be sure that we knew what the popular reaction might be.

But the reaction was fortunately extremely mild. There were very, very few demonstrations, particularly as compared with the numbers of people that might, in the past, have gone into the streets to express their views. We were very, very gratified by the upsurge of support for the action taken by the Yugoslav govern-

ment to cooperate with the tribunal, and to send Milosevic to the Hague.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much. Then finally, let me ask, I know that there is a great deal of negotiation going on, on the military side; but what about the political and the economic side? Are we paying equal attention to those problems, also?

Secretary JONES. I am sorry, do you mean in Macedonia or everywhere?

Mr. HILLIARD. Yes, definitely.

Secretary JONES. In Macedonia, to be honest, for the moment, we are very focused on a political solution. That said, we have programs already under way in Macedonia that have not fortunately had to stop, as a result of the insurgency. But the policy focus, for the moment, is on political reform and re-establishing calm in the country.

Mr. HILLIARD. Just out of curiosity, when you said "political reform," are you talking mainly about political stability, or are you talking about some type of new system or something?

Secretary JONES. I am talking about, of course, stability; but more importantly, what is underway is a discussion of a fundamental change in various elements of the political structure, including the constitution in Macedonia, to speak to the ethnic issues that have been obtained in the country for quite some time.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Cantor?

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Madam Secretary for being here, and I appreciate the opportunity for this dialogue.

Albania's political leaders have denounced the violent strategies of the ethnic Albanian guerillas operating in Macedonia. But I was curious about what Albania's role has been in the conflict, and are the guerillas in Macedonia getting more aid through Albania at this time?

Secretary JONES. The Government in Macedonia has been very supportive of the European Union effort, the NATO effort, the U.S. effort, to try to achieve a political solution to the conflict in Macedonia. They have, as you said, been outspoken against the extremists.

One of the best signs, I think, for how Albania has looked at the insurgency in Macedonia is to look at the way they conducted their parliamentary elections in the last couple of weeks.

The focus has been on Albania. It has not been on Macedonia. It has not been on what Albanians and other parts of the Balkans have been focused on. It was a very gratifying result, as a matter of fact, that Albanians are focused on their own country, on their own future, on making progress themselves.

Mr. CANTOR. I would also ask you to comment, as I know the State Department has cited Albania as a transit point for drug smuggling by organized crime. I was wondering how the government in Albania can combat this problem, and how can the international community target its assistance to it, as well.

Secretary JONES. Thank you very much. That is an extremely important issue for us. We are working hard with all of the countries in the region and outside the region to try to come to grips with

trafficking questions, narcotics as well as weapons; and of course, trafficking of women and children, as well.

We have a variety of programs targeted on the region, on working with institutions in each country, in order to come to grips with how best to stop the trafficking of narcotics through this region. It is a very important issue for us, as it is for Europe.

Mr. CANTOR. Can you give us a sense of what type of plan that there is for an international community to come in and assist in what the Albanian government itself is doing or can do?

Secretary JONES. Congressman, with your permission, I would like to come back to you with details on that. I do not have those in front of me at the moment.

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler?

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madam Secretary.

I am trying to figure out in a coherent fashion, and I was hoping maybe you could help, what the Administration's overall goal and policy is in the region, as compared to the President's statements during the campaign.

If I understood the President's basic perspective during the campaign, it was that we were too involved, and that his overall perspective was to withdraw, was to minimize the American responsibility in the region, and transfer that responsibility, to the degree possible, to the Europeans.

I was wondering if my characterization is correct, if that still is the policy. I am also wondering, with respect to Macedonia, if I understand it correctly, there are some people, not necessarily within the Administration, that are arguing that ultimately NATO is going to have to be involved in a much more significant way in Macedonia, in order to keep peace or to stabilize the region.

I am wondering if you could share with us what the Administration's position would be with respect to greater participation by NATO, with the United States as a part of NATO, in Macedonia.

Secretary JONES. On the question of what is our overall goal, our fundamental goal is to develop democratic institutions in each of these countries, so that they can be the masters of their own fate, they can be the masters of their own prosperity, and they can be the masters of their own citizens.

It is not so much a question of the United States not wishing to be involved and wanting the Europeans to be more involved. All of us want the countries themselves to take over these institutions themselves. That is what we are working for in Bosnia, that is what we are working for in Kosovo, and that is what we are working for in all of the other countries, including now Macedonia.

The President during the campaign, and the President and Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld, in talking about participation of the United States, those comments are much more focused on U.S. troops in the region.

As I say, they are there to further the goals of both NATO and the U.N. in these countries; but our fundamental premise is that we do wish to work ourselves out of a job, as far as the troops are concerned.

In terms of Macedonia, if NATO were to have to go into Macedonia, it would signify a failure of the political process. We are working extremely hard to bolster the political process, and it is for that reason that we, ourselves, the U.S., are so heavily involved in it, and why we are so gratified that the European Union, that Mr. Solana, has put a personal representative there to lead that effort.

That is, as far as all of us are concerned, in the European Union, NATO, and the U.S., the very best way to go. All of us agree that the political process is by far the most important.

All of us agree that NATO's involvement, at this point, should be limited to accepting weapons from the extremists, in the context of a political agreement and a cease-fire. A cease-fire is in place. A political agreement is under negotiation.

Mr. WEXLER. If I may, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the troops, as you mentioned, has the President set a timetable, in terms of when he hopes American troops will no longer be needed?

Secretary JONES. No, there is no timetable, but we do work very closely, or I should not say we work very closely, but we are in NATO.

The NATO 6 month review for both SFOR and KFOR are very important to us. That is the review that determines whether the troops have the correct mission in each of their deployments; whether the equipment and the units are the correct ones to carry out the mission; and it is through the NATO 6 month reviews that gradually the size of the deployments has been reduced.

Mr. WEXLER. And if I may ask finally, Mr. Chairman, just for an intellectual exercise, with respect to the troops and their ultimate timetable for coming home, is the policy of this Administration different than the policy of the previous Administration; and if it is, what is the difference in the standard or the process?

Secretary JONES. I do not perceive a difference in the policy. Certainly, there is a great focus in this Administration on engaging very, very vigorously, just as we did previously, but very vigorously in development of democratic institutions and assuring that the mission of the NATO troops in both SFOR and KFOR are focused the way it should be.

Congressman Smith mentioned the importance of police in both of these areas. There certainly is a sense that there is no longer quite the need for the heavy weapons, for the military focus of the troops, and it is time to transform the mission to civilian security kinds of issues, which is where the training of police comes in, which I would be glad to address a little bit later.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary Jones, thank you for your testimony. I hope you might want to discuss the importance of police training in Bosnia. The letter from General Ralston makes the point, after talking about the great success of the UNMIK and the Kosovo police training academy or service, he points out that he believes we need to re-examine, and this is his quote,

“the law enforcement structures currently in place in Bosnia, and re-organize to facilitate re-establishing a rule of law there.

The cooperative UNMIK and OSCE effort in Kosovo should serve as a model in this effort.”

He goes on to say,

“The costs associated with training and fielding police officers from the indigenous populace is minuscule when compared to the costs of maintaining the international military presence currently deployed to the Balkans.”

Can you tell us the view of the Administration on this; whether or not you think this is something that can and should be pursued, and if any planning has been done along these lines?

Secretary JONES. The short answer is yes. I was very fortunate to have had a similar conversation with General Ralston a couple of weeks ago. As I mentioned, it is very important for us to focus, and we have been focusing for some time on how to improve the police function in both Kosovo and Bosnia, but particularly in Bosnia.

Let me back up a second. I think it is fair to say that we used some best practices and some lessons learned in developing the police training the way we did in Kosovo. There is no question that it has been quite successful, and we are very gratified by your comments and by General Ralston’s comments as to the success of that program.

We would like very much to use some of the experience that we have gained in that program to transfer it back, if you will, to Bosnia.

One of the areas that we are working with now is to see how to use the international structures that have already been agreed to in Bosnia under Dayton to allow us to do the kind of police training and to transform the police function in a way that makes it more unified across the republics, across the entities, and that makes it more effective, so that it will be able to handle the kinds of situations you outlined in your statement.

One of things that we were very gratified by, for instance, is that in the ceremonies today commemorating the sixth anniversary of the terrible events in Srebrenica, that the police functioned extremely well at those events, and we were very gratified by that. We hope that that kind of dedication, that kind of focus, can continue and be enhanced.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Do you have a timeline of when you think this could be accomplished?

Secretary JONES. Here is the way we hope it will work. The structure that we work with is the peace implementation council that was formed under Dayton. We have circulated to members of the peace implementation council some suggestions for how one might upgrade, change, transform the training of the police, and the functions of the police in Bosnia.

We hope to address this in a more focused way at the next peace implementation council meeting in September. In the meantime, we are working on the ground in Bosnia with the Office of the High Representative, and with the other international structures in Bosnia, to work toward exactly the kind of goal that you outlined.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. One of the bilateral meetings that we had in Paris was with the speaker of the Yugoslav Parliament,

Micunovic. During the course of the exchange, we raised the issue of policing there, because he complained that their government does not have enough police, and they certainly do not have enough adequately trained police.

It seems that when OTPOR and some of the others who have been literally turning in the names of police who have committed crimes, and running the risk to themselves of retaliation, the sooner they are up and running with a professional, transparent human rights-oriented police force, the better.

Is there any thought being given to taking, again, the Kosovo experience, obviously with the cooperation of the government in Serbia and Yugoslavia, offering perhaps some of the auspices of the OSCE, the model, again, for there, as well?

Secretary JONES. I can not say there has not been any thought given to it, because I may not be briefed on all the thought that has been given to it. But it is certainly an extremely good suggestion, and we will work along those lines, absolutely, thank you.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I appreciate that.

Let me ask you briefly and finally, Mr. Chairman, on the issue of trafficking, I know that the June 1st deadline has come and gone, and I am in regular contact with Paula Dobriansky.

She assures me that report will be forthcoming, and every "I" is being looked at and every "T" crossed, to make sure that it is totally accurate, since it is the first report pursuant to section 108 of the law, that we passed last year on trafficking.

But if you could speak briefly, and I know my time is up, to the criminal links. Are we engaging bilaterally with these countries, Macedonia, Serbia, Yugoslavia, or Montenegro, to ensure that mitigating and hopefully ending this horrible trafficking of human persons, including for forced prostitution, including children even in Albania, is a high priority for the Administration?

Secretary JONES. There is no question that it is a very high priority of this Administration. We have been engaging bilaterally. I cannot honestly tell you the details of all the engagement, but it is something that is extremely important to all of us.

The report that you mentioned I believe is coming out in a matter of days, maybe hours. But it is something that is right at the top of our agenda in the European Bureau.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Any details for the record would be appreciated, thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; Madam Secretary, welcome.

In your written testimony, you indicate that SFOR's deployment is currently about 20,000. Is that accurate?

Secretary JONES. That is right, yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Does that reflect any reduction whatsoever in the course of the past 12 months?

Secretary JONES. It reflects a reduction over the past 12 months of about 750. That reduction is underway right now as a result of the last 6 month review by NATO. It is, of course, a reduction from the original 60,000.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right, but in the course of the past 12 months, there has been effected a reduction of some 750; or that 750 has not been achieved as of yet, has it?

Secretary JONES. The 750 reduction is underway right at the moment. To tell the honest truth, I do not know exactly how many of the 750 are out, right this minute. But it is very much underway.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And our contribution to KFOR is approximately 13 to 14 percent of the total force?

Secretary JONES. That is right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Then what does that reflect in terms of numbers?

Secretary JONES. I do not have it off the top of my head. I am sorry.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The questions that was posed by my colleague from Florida, Mr. Wexler, prompted me to ask those two questions, because it is also my memory that there was much discussion early on about a rather dramatic reduction in the number of American troops in the region. It would appear that that has not been too dramatic. I think that is a fair statement.

Secretary JONES. May I just correct what I just said?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure.

Secretary JONES. It is a 2,000 troop reduction overall, 750 of whom are American.

Mr. DELAHUNT. 750?

Secretary JONES. 750 are American; a 2,000 troop reduction in the last NATO review.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay, 2,000 American troops or 2,000 troops overall?

Secretary JONES. 2,000 overall of the entire force.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay, my point is the American involvement here. I think I heard you say that really what is occurring now is an extension of the original policy of the previous Administration. Is that a fair statement?

Secretary JONES. It is a fair statement in the following respect. Dayton is very much in place in Bosnia. That is the international agreement that we are working in, in Bosnia.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, let me ask you this, and maybe I am not being clear enough. What change of policy has occurred, if any, with the advent of this Administration from the previous Administration, in terms of the realities on the ground?

I am not talking about rhetoric, but I am talking about what, in fact, is occurring in the Balkan region, specifically in the countries where the focus of the focus of the questions has been on. Has there been any change whatsoever?

Secretary JONES. The greatest focus of the change has been a big push to reduce the American presence and the overall military presence in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And to date, we have achieved a reduction of some 750?

Secretary JONES. So far.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So far?

Secretary JONES. That is right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay, I yield back.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gilman?

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for conducting this hearing and reviewing where we have been in Bosnia and where we are going for the future.

I would like to request consent to submit for the record my statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE  
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for holding these important hearings to review accomplishments in the Balkans to date and to consider the future agenda. I want to welcome Beth Jones, making her first appearance before our International Relations Committee as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. It is a pleasure to have the benefit of your thinking.

In the Balkans, the United States, along with our allies, has undertaken major initiatives to mediate centuries-old conflicts. The ancient fears, jealousies and strife that broke the peace in Southeast Europe in the last decade threatened regional peace at a time of hope after the fall of communist governments in Europe.

With limited military engagement—through Peacekeepers in Bosnia and an intervention in Kosovo—quite a bit has been accomplished. Peace, if uneasy, has been established. Major refugee flows have been reversed. Significant efforts are underway to sow institutions of democracy.

However, we recognize that much remains to be done before we can congratulate ourselves—or the people of the Balkans. At this point, it looks like continuing, determined intervention will be required to maintain peace and security and to promote democracy for the foreseeable future.

This fact underlines my sense that the United States should be very clear about its goals and intentions with respect to international obligations which we commit to as a nation. Before we commit to an engagement, we should pause to consider, in practical terms, any strategic or other—such as humanitarian—interest of the United States. In light of identified interests, we should decide what price we are willing to pay to achieve identified goals. We need to consider the cost of achieving a satisfactory conclusion and decide if we are willing to pay the price. If we are not inclined to undertake that burden, I suggest we are not ready for engagement.

In the case of the Balkans—Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia—I am interested to hear the assessment of our witnesses of what additional costs are anticipated to bring about a lasting, self-sustaining peace with security and economic opportunity. Only then will our nation be able to end our intensive involvement.

We have committed to this cause. As the President said on his recent European trip, “. . . our goal must be to hasten the arrival of that day when we can all (that is, the U.S. and our allies) come out together.” I believe we should do our utmost now to bear the cost, create the necessary conditions, and “all come out together,” as soon as possible.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Again, these important hearings to review the accomplishments of the Balkans to date and to consider the future agenda are important to the entire Congress.

I want to welcome Beth Jones, making her first appearance before the International Relations Committee as the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. We hope you will be coming for many more occasions. We welcome having the benefit of your thoughts.

In the Balkans, our nation, along with our allies, has undertaken major initiatives to try to mediate these centuries-old conflicts. The ancient fears, jealousies, the strife that broke the peace in Southeast Europe in the last decade threatened regional peace at a time of hope after the fall of Communist governments in Europe.

With limited military engagement through peacekeepers in Bosnia and their intervention in Kosovo, quite a bit has been accom-

plished. Peace, if uneasy, has been established. Major refugee flows have been reversed to some extent. Significant efforts are underway to sew institutions of democracy, and we hope they can continue to go forward.

However, we recognize that a great deal more has to be done before we can pat ourselves on the back or congratulate the people of the Balkans. At this point, it looks like continuing determined intervention is going to be required to maintain peace and security, and to promote democracy for the foreseeable future.

That fact underlies no sense that our nation should be very clear about its goals and intentions with respect to our international obligations, which we commit to as a nation.

But before we commit to any additional engagement, I think we should pause to consider in practical terms any strategic or other such interests such as the humanitarian interests of our own nation. In light of intensified interest, we should decide what price our nation is willing to pay to achieve the kind of goals we want.

We need to consider the cost of achieving a satisfactory conclusion, and decide if we are willing to pay the price for achieving that kind of a goal. If we are not inclined to undertake that burden, then I suggest we are not ready for a future engagement. So I think we should resolve that issue.

In the case of the Balkans, Bosnia, and Macedonia, we are interested to hear your assessment of what additional costs are anticipated to bring about a lasting, self-sustaining peace with security and economic opportunities. Only then can our nation be able to end our intensive involvement.

We have committed to this cause, and as our President said on his recent trip to Europe, and I quote, "Our goal must be to hasten the arrival of that day when we can all, that is U.S. and our allies, come out together."

I believe we should do our utmost now to bear the costs, create the necessary conditions, and all be able to come out together, as soon as possible.

Let me ask you one question. How is the Administration preparing to make a concerted effort, doing what it takes to complete our work in the Balkans, so that we may properly bring to a close our extraordinary engagement in that region?

Secretary JONES. The Administration is working very intensively to develop the democratic institutions that must be in place and the democratic leadership that must be elected, in order for these countries to take over their own governance.

It is a difficult proposition. It is more difficult in some countries than others. We have been very gratified by the peaceful elections recently in Bulgaria and Albania. We are looking forward to elections in Kosovo, parliamentary elections in Kosovo.

This is exactly the process that is necessary in order for the democratic re-elected leaders to be selected and to take over responsibility for governance in their regions and their countries.

Mr. GILMAN. And are we making some real progress in those areas?

Secretary JONES. We believe we are; yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Secretary Jones, I realize that it is difficult to predict the future, but can you provide a realistic assessment of how

much longer we may have to continue our deep engagement in the Balkans, if we undertake even more pointed efforts to establish democratic institutions, and to establish a self-sustaining peace and economic opportunity in that region?

Secretary JONES. Congressman, there is no question, as I said earlier, that we are trying to work ourselves out of a job here. But I cannot honestly give you a time line.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you recommend any reduction of our armed forces in that region, or should we maintain the same numbers that we have?

Secretary JONES. We remain guided by the work that is done by the NATO 6 month review. They are the experts. They know very well how to evaluate the situation on the ground, with what is the best focus for the NATO missions.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

The gentleman from Sherman Oaks, California, Mr. Sherman?

Mr. SHERMAN. The gentleman from Ventura Country, California is pleased to be with you, Mr. Chairman.

I think this hearing has done an outstanding job of looking at the details of what is going on the Balkans, and I would like to focus a little bit about our overall burden-sharing relationship with the European Union.

I think we will remember that when we first got involved in Bosnia, the Congress was told, it was only to be for 6 months. That estimate was not off by 10 percent or 20 percent. It is already off by 1,000 percent, and we will probably be off by 100,000 percent. That is to say, it would not surprise me if we still had expenditures of dollars to keep peace in Bosnia, 50 years after we went there.

Now Europe is larger than we are, richer than we are, and contributes not one penny to the defense of Taiwan; contributes virtually nothing to the defense of Korea. It is doing virtually nothing to deal with the national security issues we face here in this hemisphere.

So their idea of burden-sharing is, when it is their continent, we have to do half; and when it is anywhere else in the world, we have to do the whole thing, which strikes me as an odd approach for a continent that is larger and richer than we are, and is running a huge trade surplus with us, and which has recently taken it upon itself to try to play an equal role with the United States in forming Western policies on the environment, missile defense, et cetera. Just because they happen to be right is no reason that their assertiveness should not be matched by a contribution of funds.

I think our foreign policy establishment has done an outstanding job of protecting European taxpayers from the costs of European involvement in the world; even defending them, in part, from the costs of European involvement in Europe.

I would ask the question, but I already know the answer, so it is not really a question. I assume the Administration has not gone to the Europeans, since this Administration took over, and asked for them to send cash to defray at least half the costs of defending South Korea; nor have we asked them to deploy troops in support of the U.N. commitment to defend South Korea.

I know that we have not asked them to send a single troop or a single dollar or a single ship in the defense of Taiwan.

So I know they are doing absolutely nothing in Asian hot spots, and I think the State Department under-calculates the cost of our involvement in the Balkans; because let us face it, this change in Serbian political realities is, in large part, due to military realities, because of the overwhelming power and overwhelming expense of maintaining huge military bases here in the United States, in Germany, in Italy.

When you have them buy the overwhelming military power, their hearts and minds and the extradition of Milosevic follow. Yet, when we look at our costs in the Balkans, the fact that we have airborne troops in North Carolina, ready to be deployed to Europe, should that be necessary, are omitted, the costs of our air bases in Italy and German are not thought of, because they are not currently being used, in an active sense, in the former Yugoslavia.

Yet, one can only imagine what political changes there would be in Belgrade if tomorrow, the entire military power of the United States was not available to enforce the world view.

So we, in Congress, will provide the money. We will be told it is 6 months. We will be lucky if it is only 50 years. We will be told the Europeans are doing their part, because they are doing their part in Europe.

We will wait to see whether this foreign policy, combined with our economic policy, allows us to continue to be prosperous, compared to Europe, or whether they will have, over the years, hoodwinked us into not only some bad trade policies that are well outside this hearing scope, but a defense policy that is all cost for us and wonderful defense for them.

I do not know if you have a response. It does not require one.

Secretary JONES. I have a brief response. The United States works very hard and is a very strong supporter of the trans-Atlantic relationship. We are an active and enthusiastic member of NATO. That accounts, to a great extent, for our very heavy involvement in Europe. It accounts for our continued desire to assure that we help work toward a Europe, whole, free, and secure.

Certainly, the burden-sharing is an important issue for us. The Europeans have stepped up to the task, to a great extent, in Europe. The U.S. contribution and participation in each of these efforts is below 20 percent, and in some cases, below 15 percent.

Mr. SHERMAN. That is unless you count all those other costs that I pointed out that you are omitting, which run into the tens of billions of dollars.

Secretary JONES. In any case, I wanted to just take the opportunity to underscore the importance to the United States of our participation in NATO, and our participation with our allies in a Europe, whole, free, and secure.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter?

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you, first of all, for holding this hearing.

Certainly, with respect to Macedonia, for example, our vital national interests are clearly affected by what happens in that country. I think we need to send a strong and unequivocal message that we are for the continued solidarity of that country, without a divi-

sion of it, in any fashion, because we do not want to fracture the NATO Alliance, which is potentially at risk here.

I want to focus on the time of June 26th and June 27th. First of all, I have a statement, and then secondly a question, Madam Secretary, and I want to welcome you, along with other Members, in your first appearance before this Subcommittee or the Committee in your current capacity.

On June 26th, American soldiers in Macedonia, as a part of a NATO contingency, were asked to bus rebels out of Aricenovo, a village close to Skopje. The American force did not force the Albanians to disarm, a move which may have been criticized as contributing to the ethnic Albanians belief that the U.S. is, or will in the future, support its efforts at greater autonomy or Greater Albania.

I want to just say definitively, I have checked on this issue with the highest levels of this Administration, and that was not a policy move on the part of this Administration. That was a field decision which has been roundly rebuked now within the Administration. So people should have no question about that being a very bad decision made in the field.

On June 27th, President Bush stated that no option for approaching the situation for Macedonia is off the table. I was very reassured to hear that. Additionally, he commendably issued an Executive Order barring transactions between Americans and known ethnic Albanian rebel leaders who, by the way, the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, referred to as "terrorists."

I wonder now, Madam Secretary, if you can tell us how that is being implemented? Are we denying visas, or what other methods are we using to proceed? I understand not much time has transpired since the 26th of June, but perhaps you have an outline as to what has been done and what will be done?

Secretary JONES. The Executive Orders are in force. They are being implemented. If any of those people on the list were to apply for visas, the visas would be denied.

As information comes to U.S. Government agencies of financial transactions undertaken that are prohibited by the Executive Order, those would be investigated and pursued through legal structures in the United States.

Mr. BEREUTER. At this point, has it had an impact in the implementation? Have we stopped people? Have we had an action on a financial transaction?

Secretary JONES. The primary effect that it has had is as a signal that we do not support extremists. We do not support Albanian extremists. There was a certain misperception in the region as to where the U.S. stood; vis-a-vis, Albanians of any persuasion.

This is part of our effort to underscore that we abhor extremism of any kind, from any quarter. I cannot say that there have been any applications for visas from any of the people on the list. I believe there have not been, so far.

Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Secretary, of course, Macedonia has been, for some time, a major logistical support corridor and base for our operations in Kosovo, and we have substantial logistical troops there as a part of this personnel.

Has the Administration made any decision, or are they willing to make a decision, if necessary, going beyond logistical troops, to deal with a violent situation in Macedonia?

Secretary JONES. No, the troops will remain as KFOR rear at Able Century, near Skopje. They are logistics troops. They are support troops. The participation of the United States in a NATO operation to disarm, to receive the weapons from extremists in connection with a political settlement would be in a support role.

Mr. BEREUTER. My time is about to expire, but I do notice and mention that President Bush has indicated that no options are off the table with respect to Macedonia and its continued viability as a multi-ethnic country.

We will certainly push them to assure adequate equal rights and civil rights for all of its citizens, including the Albanian ethnic Macedonians.

But the President's statement would seem to suggest that if necessary, we will have forces that exceed logistical and go into combat troops, if necessary, to support the continued solidarity of Macedonia. Is that a fair assumption?

Secretary JONES. That is not an assumption that I can really make.

Mr. BEREUTER. Has it been precluded?

Secretary JONES. Suffice it to say, because of past years of extremely bad experience in the Balkans, there is a very, very strong effort underway to do as much as we possibly can to push the political process, so that the question you raise will not ever come to the President's desk.

Mr. BEREUTER. Well, I appreciate that, but I guess the President then needs to be reminded that this Congress, on a bipartisan basis, worked with President Clinton to assure that we had a preventive peacekeeping force of American and Scandinavian troops in Macedonia. So it is quite a different situation than President Clinton faced with respect to Bosnia, in the Congress, as it being avoided in the process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman from Nebraska.

As you have heard, we have not only a vote, but a series of votes. We have one Member left that has not had an opportunity to ask the Secretary a question. Mr. Engel, would you like to ask a question?

Mr. ENGEL. Yes, I would; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I chair the Albania Issues Caucus in the Congress. I like to think that I am very knowledgeable about the situation. I have been to the Balkans several times. I just want to clear up some mis-perceptions, I think.

First of all, let me just say that I support the solidarity of Macedonia. I think it is important that the country remain together. I do not support any succession. I do not support a Greater Albania.

What irritates me is that people who want to belittle the legitimate concerns that the Albanian population in Macedonia always kind of throw up this bugaboo, this skeleton of Greater Albania. So any time Albanians want to legitimately talk about things that have been denied them, they are accused of clamoring for a Greater Albania.

Now it seems to me that the government of Macedonia, for 10 years, made empty promises to the Albania community. In your testimony, you said, "In Macedonia, a violent insurgency seeks to de-stabilize a country that has experienced 10 years of democratic multi-ethnic governance."

I would not really agree with that totally, because I do not think that it has been a multi-ethnic governance. You do have Albanian political parties. You do have Albanians sharing the leadership. But the fact of the matter is the Macedonia Slavs have made lots of promises to the Albanian community that have not been carried out.

I think if you want to stop an insurgency, and I do; I do not support the NLA; I do not support violence in changing things; but if you want to stop the insurgency, you address the very legitimate concerns that all Albanians in Macedonia have, not just the insurgents.

It is very easy to brand people as terrorists. The fact is, if Mr. Georgievski and Mr. Trajkovski had fulfilled some of the things they said; Mr. Trajkovski made promises to me and a whole group of people in November 1999, that if he was elected, he would implement certain things. None of those promises have been kept.

You know, you have a constitution in Macedonia, which talks about Macedonia is a country of Macedonians; meaning Macedonian Slavs, and others will have protection. Well, I think that ethnic Albanians in Macedonia are Macedonians. And if you are not going to make them Macedonians, if they are always going to be "others," then you are going to have problems.

The unemployment of Albanians is tremendous in those communities. They are not given a fair shake in the electoral process. They are not allowed to have the Albanian language taught at the university level. I can go on and on.

You know, we like to think of the United States as a kind of a melting pot. The fact of the matter is, in the Balkans, there are at least two very large groups in Macedonia; and if you are not going to make Albanian a national language, when at least 25 percent, and I have heard 40 or 45 percent, of a population is of that ethnicity, then it is ridiculous to just pretend that Macedonia is somehow a multi-ethnic state.

What bothers me, and I do think, you know, the verdict is still out with this Administration on policy, and I have met with Secretary Powell, as did my co-Chair, Sue Kelly, and we were very encouraged by what the Secretary had to say; but I think that when we stress too much the territorial integrity of Macedonia, which I agree with, and we do not push those people to make the very legitimate changes that they need to make, for 10 years that they have not done, the legitimate concerns of the Albanian there, I am afraid that the government of Macedonia crying wolf all the time; oh, my God, these terrible Albanians are trying to destroy our country, and they use that as an excuse for inaction, I think that we, as Americans, need to pressure them to come forth with the things that they need to do, so that their country can be kept whole.

I just would like you to comment on that, because I get very upset when I hear people dismissed as terrorists, because it tends

to de-legitimatize what they and moderates of Albanian extraction in Macedonia are saying. The Albanian community in Macedonia all agree that they are third class citizens; not even second class citizens.

I think that we need to read the riot act to the government in Skopje to tell them that if they want this insurgency to end, and I hope it ends, then the way to end it is to address these very legitimate Albanian concerns.

Secretary JONES. I would be glad to address that. The government in Skopje, starting with President Trajkovski, invited a French constitutional lawyer, one who is very well respected in the region, Mr. Boddenter, to come to Macedonia to sit down with the members of the unity government separately and together, to understand from them some of the constitutional issues that need to be addressed.

He left behind a report that has informed the discussion underway right now, the negotiations under way right now, being led by Mr. Leotard, Mr. Solana's representative, in close association with my advisor for the Balkans, Ambassador Pardew.

I cannot tell you exactly the details of where they are right this minute in the negotiation, but many of the issues that you mentioned are certainly under discussion, and hopefully will be addressed, both in the political framework agreement, and separately in constitutional changes that are under discussion.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I will end then, Mr. Chairman. I hope we really push them and not allow the government in Skopje to hide behind this, oh, my God, our country is about to be broken up, because they have used that for too long, and there has just been talk. You know, there is a real chance to work things out, if these legitimate problems are met.

But when they have negotiations with the Albanian political parties across the spectrum, some of whom share the government with them, and they are intransigent, the Macedonian Slavs are intransigent in terms of addressing these problems, it is very, very hard to come to an agreement. I believe only with the American presence and pushing the government of Skopje to address these legitimate problems, will they be addressed.

I thank you, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Engel.

Madam Secretary, thank you so much for being here. We appreciate your testimony.

I would also like to commend the department, and especially the legislative affairs office, for getting the testimony to the Subcommittee in a very timely fashion; much better than we are normally accustomed to. I wish you would pass that on to them, with our great appreciation. Thank you for being here.

As everyone has heard and they say on the screen, we have a series of votes. So the Committee will stand in recess, and we will return as promptly as we can for the next panel. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.

Secretary JONES. Thank you very much. Thanks for the opportunity.

[Recess.]

Mr. BEREUTER [presiding]. The Subcommittee will come to order. We are very pleased to introduce our second distinguished panel on the hearing today on the Balkans. On panel number two are these two gentleman: Dr. Daniel P. Serwer, Director of the Balkans Initiative, U.S. Institute of Peace; and Mr. James R. Hooper, the Managing Director, Public International Law and Policy Group.

Gentlemen, we very much appreciate your testimony. The Members will be coming back very, very shortly. I want to tell you that your entire statements will be made a part of the record. We will proceed as you wish in your own testimony. If you wish to summarize or use parts of your testimony, you can be assured that the entire testimony will be part of the record.

I am going to recess here for about a minute and a half, so that you have more Members here. So we will stand at ease for about a minute and a half here, and then we will be under way.

[Recess.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Doctor Serwer, now we will be able to see your graphics and the audience can, too. I think we need to begin now. So you may proceed as you wish, Dr. Serwer.

**STATEMENT OF DANIEL P. SERWER, PH.D., DIRECTOR,  
BALKANS INSTITUTE, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE**

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

As I am going to be optimistic about the prospects for the Balkans in the next 5 years, I want to start by underlining how difficult and complicated the problems are. This map is my effort to structure the issues. The red triangle is where the U.S. entered the Balkans in 1995, when Zagreb and Belgrade were trying to dismantle Bosnia. We still face serious problems with Croat and Serb nationalists there.

The black triangle represents the continuing dissolution of Yugoslavia: Podgorica and Pristina have achieved a large measure of independence from Belgrade, but the juridical status of Montenegro and Kosovo remains unresolved.

The green triangle, which connects Pristina, Tirana, and Skopje, represents the issue of Greater Albania, the question of the relationship among Albanian populations in different Balkans countries, and the threat that Albanian extremism poses to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia. No one would describe this as a simple picture, or as an easily resolvable one.

Nevertheless, I am pleased to be able to report that throughout the Balkans, democratic processes are proving, as they have often in the past, an antidote to violence. Were it not for the Albanian extremists in Macedonia, we would be enjoying one of the best moments the Balkans have seen for years.

The democratic government in Croatia has been running big political risks trying to correct the nationalist excesses of the Tudjman regime.

The new government in Serbia is beginning to make amends for the disasters of the Milosevic era, including his arrest and transfer to the Hague, and Belgrade has avoided his mistakes in dealing with Albanian guerillas in southern Serbia.

Bosnia has, for the first time since the 1995 Dayton Accords, non-nationalist governments, except in Republika Srpska; and you

have met, just in the last day or so, Bosnia's very distinguished and admirable future Prime Minister.

Even in Republika Srpska, the Prime Minister has begun to signal a willingness to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal.

In Kosovo, moderates triumphed in municipal elections last October, as they likely will again in November's Kosovo-wide elections. Kosovo Serbs are registering, though they have not yet decided whether they will vote.

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I am going to skip my country-specific analysis, but I would like to submit for the record the full statement.

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection, that will be the order.

Mr. SERWER. What then does all this mean for the United States? First, it means that perseverance in the right direction brings results. While no one can be happy so long as Serbs are mistreated in Kosovo or extremist rebellion threatens Macedonia, the situation is dramatically improved from 10 years ago, when nationalist leaderships bent on war found broad popular support.

Better coordinated and concerted actions by Europe and the United States, with many other countries pitching in, are slowly making democracy, free markets, and protection of human rights the main goals of most people in the Balkans.

Not everyone shares these goals, however. We and our European partners need to learn how better to defeat extremists and strengthen moderates. We did well to support the democratic opposition in Serbia and moderates in Bosnia. We are doing better in countering Croat and Serb extremists in Bosnia, and in preventing arms and money from reaching Albanian extremists in Macedonia and Kosovo.

If we enhance these efforts by ensuring, for example, that the main indicted war criminals in Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia are arrested and sent to the Hague, peaceful solutions will be easier to find.

It is especially difficult to deal with nationalists ensconced in legitimate democratic governments and political parties. It must be made clear to all our friends that U.S. assistance requires abandonment of hopes of Greater Serbia or Greater Albania, as well as schemes for driving Albanians from parts of Macedonia. We should insist on concrete steps: Belgrade must reform its military, including retirement of those who commanded the army during Milosevic's wars, and end assistance to separatists in Bosnia and Kosovo. This will open the door for expanded cooperation between NATO, the U.S. and the Yugoslav Army, as well as to the possible lifting of the U.N. arms embargo. Kosovo Albanians should enter a dialogue with Belgrade on the question of missing people, and end support for the guerrillas in Macedonia. Skopje must crack down on the misbehavior of its army and police forces, ending mistreatment of Albanian civilians, and arresting reservists who have rioted against them. The Macedonian government has the right to defend itself against an armed insurgency, but not to conduct or to allow a war against its citizens.

Essential to any effort to defeat extremists is establishment of the rule of law. We can rebuild schools, return people home, pro-

vide loans to small enterprise, but lasting results require law and order.

The problems we still face in the Balkans all involve criminal, as well as political elements. Once Balkans ethnic problems are under control, I expect organized crime and trafficking of all sorts to remain.

The U.S. should, in my view, refocus a major portion of its assistance efforts to support for police and independent judiciaries. This is work we do well; we just have not done enough of it.

The rule of law should be part of a broader effort to establish stronger states in the Balkans. Even without ethnic problems, Macedonia would have difficulties, because it is a weak state; like Albania, which suffered massive refugee outflows and internal violence without ethnic tension.

Building up the Balkans states should primarily be a European responsibility, since it is essential for their relations with the EU. But the U.S. should be prepared to contribute, if only because of its interest in combating criminality.

Are U.S. troops stuck in the Balkans forever? Will they have to go to Macedonia? If the international community can unify its own fragmented civilian efforts in Bosnia, I believe the situation there will permit, over the next several years, further drawdown of foreign military forces.

There is no military threat in Bosnia today that Europeans cannot handle. The reason for the U.S. troops to remain is to reassure both Europeans and Bosnians that the U.S. is not disengaging.

That we should also be able to do in other ways. The U.S. should be making commitments to integrating the three Bosnian armies, unifying and strengthening international civilian implementation, and providing it with an executive police force. We should also be committing ourselves to the abolition of the three separate intelligence services that were mentioned this afternoon already.

The same is not true in Kosovo. Only the U.S. has the credibility with Albanians and Serbs to ensure that the European-led force in Kosovo is able to stay on top of the situation. It will be some time before democratic institutions there are strong enough to counter criminality, political extremism, and ethnic hatred.

Some of my colleagues argue that U.S. support for Kosovo independence would help to stabilize the situation there. I do not agree. It would instead strain our relations with our Allies and with Serbs and Macedonians.

Kosovo cannot be governed from Belgrade, but the Security Council will remove the international protectorate only when Serbs believe that their legitimate interests will be protected. Until then, foreign forces will have to stay.

Are NATO, including the U.S., going to have to send troops into Macedonia? The answer is, yes. Only NATO can disarm the guerrillas, assuming a political solution is found.

And NATO may well have to do more. It will be some time before the Macedonian army and police will be able to return to some parts of the country. International monitors will be required.

NATO, whose credibility depends on the participation of U.S. forces, should rule out nothing and prepare for everything. I think it is especially important not to rule out a long-term presence or

a deployment beyond areas where the insurgency has occurred. European troops may lead the effort, but at least U.S. logistics and intelligence will be crucial. I emphasize, at the least.

What about sending in troops without an agreed political solution? A number of people are proposing that NATO move into Macedonia before the fighting makes the situation even more difficult. They note that imposed solutions proved necessary in Bosnia and in Kosovo.

The problem is that NATO wants to fight neither the Albanian nor the Macedonia government forces. In addition, a forcible deployment of NATO into part of Macedonia could well lead to further ethnic division and even partition, precisely the opposite of what we would want.

Our diplomacy should be vigorous, bringing to bear all the political, legal, military, and economic instruments at our disposal. But I do not see for the moment an alternative to a negotiated political solution.

Mr. Chairman, the Balkans are not inherently a region of major U.S. strategic interest. We are there because our absence would aggravate the situation and severely disrupt other strategic interests, including relations with our European Allies and with Russia, as well as U.S. and NATO credibility worldwide.

There have been major improvements in the Balkans in the last 5 years. If we continue to turn Kosovo and Bosnia in the right direction and get Macedonia right, 5 years hence, we could see a much reduced U.S. military commitment. The Balkans will then be on the road to Europe, where the region belongs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Serwer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL P. SERWER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, BALKANS INSTITUTE,  
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning in my personal capacity. The Balkans are my beat: I was in Kosovo and Tirana in March, Podgorica, Belgrade and Skopje in May, and I'll be returning to Belgrade, Pristina, and Sarajevo in a few days. The views I offer on what is going on there and elsewhere in the Balkans are my own and not those of the US Institute of Peace, which does not take positions on policy issues.

As I am going to be optimistic about the prospects for the Balkans in the next five years, I want to start by underlining how difficult and complicated the problems are. This map is my effort to structure the issues. The red triangle is where the US entered the Balkans in 1995, when Zagreb and Belgrade were trying to dismantle Bosnia. We still face serious problems with Croat and Serb nationalists there. The black triangle represents the continuing dissolution of Yugoslavia: Podgorica and Pristina have achieved a large measure of independence from Belgrade, but the juridical status of Montenegro and Kosovo remains unresolved. The green triangle—which connects Pristina, Tirana and Skopje—represents the issue of Greater Albania, the question of the relationship among Albanian populations in different Balkans countries, and the threat that Albanian extremism poses to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia. No one would describe this as a simple picture, or as an easily resolvable one.

Nevertheless I am pleased to be able to report that throughout the Balkans democratic processes are proving, as they have often in the past, an antidote to violence. Were it not for the Albanian extremists in Macedonia, we would be enjoying one of the best moments the Balkans have seen for ten years. The democratic government in Croatia has been running big political risks trying to correct the nationalist excesses of the Tadjman regime. The new government in Serbia is beginning to make amends for the disasters of the Milosevic era, including his arrest and transfer to The Hague, and has avoided his mistakes in dealing with Albanian guerillas in southern Serbia. Bosnia has, for the first time since the 1995 Dayton accords,

non-nationalist governments, except in Republika Srpska. Even there, the prime minister has begun to signal willingness to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal. In Kosovo, moderates triumphed in municipal elections last October, as they likely will again in November's Kosovo-wide elections. Kosovo Serbs are registering, though they have not yet decided whether they will vote.

#### DEMOCRACY IS MAKING PROGRESS

*Croatia.* When Croatian President Mesic and Prime Minister Racan took office a year and a half ago, Zagreb was a troublemaker in Bosnia and a scourge to the Croatian Serbs. Today, Zagreb is a friend to Bosnia and Herzegovina and is beginning to make amends for the treatment of its Serb citizens. It needs to continue and expand that process, returning to their homes as many Serbs as want to go and arresting and transferring Hague indictees. For this, Croatia will need economic assistance. It will also need cooperation from Bosnia's Republika Srpska, since many Croat refugees from Bosnia now occupy Serb homes in Croatia. Getting Croats back to Republika Srpska—which has so far proven extremely difficult—would therefore enable Serbs to return to Croatia.

*Bosnia.* Inside Bosnia, the remarkable turnaround in Zagreb has made Croat nationalists, deprived of Zagreb's support and under pressure from the international community, turn desperate. Their efforts to undermine the Dayton agreements and Bosnian sovereignty should be seen for what they are: the dying throes of a criminal/extremist enterprise. Croat citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have legitimate grievances that need to be handled through democratic processes, not through extra-constitutional means. Perseverance by the international community is bringing the right response.

The situation in Republika Srpska has not progressed as far. A reformist prime minister there has begun to recognize the importance of rooting out the major indicted war criminals, but he faces vigorous opposition, not the least in his own police force and army. The criminal/extremist enterprise in Republika Srpska is still very much alive. Once it is defeated, international assistance should be quick and generous.

In Sarajevo, there are at last non-nationalist governments of the Croat/Bosniak Federation and of the Bosnian state, for the first time since Dayton. This opportunity should not be wasted. The central government should be strengthened, but with sensitivity to the need for strong local governance as well. The Bosnian "entities," the nationalist-dominated halves of the country, should be weakened and their capacity to interfere with Dayton—especially the return of minorities to their homes—eliminated. The three armies in Bosnia need to be integrated, beginning with their command structures.

*Yugoslavia.* Progress in Bosnia requires cooperation from Belgrade, where change is real but slow. Serbian nationalism today is taking less virulent forms, but segments of the leadership and population continue to feel victimized and harbor dreams of Greater Serbia. Important steps have been taken: not only the arrest and transfer to The Hague of Milosevic but also the careful handling of Albanian extremists in southern Serbia and the promised cut-off of payments to the Bosnian Serb Army. But large parts of the Milosevic regime remain in place in Belgrade. The police and judiciary are unreformed. President Kostunica, whose party has seen an influx of former Milosevic enthusiasts, appears comfortable governing with the support of an unreformed Army. We are seeing a political contest between the more traditionalist forces supporting the Yugoslav President and the more modernizing forces supporting the Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic.

In Podgorica, an exemplary Parliamentary election has produced a yellow warning signal: pro-independence forces at the moment have enough votes to call and perhaps win a referendum, but not enough votes to implement an independence decision, which requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament. President Djukanovic would like to put off the independence referendum and try to negotiate a separation—if not an outright divorce—with Serbia. In any event, both pro- and anti-independence forces in Montenegro have said they will refrain from violence and seek their ends through constitutional means. I believe a negotiated solution is possible and desirable, but will require a much stronger dialogue not only between Belgrade and Podgorica but also among the Montenegrins. The main international community concern should not be about the outcome in Montenegro, but rather about the process. If the separation is peaceful and negotiated, Montenegro will not create a negative precedent for Bosnia or Kosovo. Albania. Tirana has made major progress since the collapse of early 1997. Democratic institutions there are far from consolidated, but they are strengthening, and it shows. Economic growth is strong, Parliamentary elections in the last month came off well compared to prior elections. And most im-

portantly: all but a few people in Albania recognize that Greater Albania is a myth, one they think not worth pursuing.

*Kosovo.* Last fall's Kosovo municipal elections have been an important step forward, and I am pleased to report that a multiethnic Association of Municipalities has been formed with USIP help. But major improvement requires a Kosovo-wide governing structure with democratic legitimacy. Elections this fall will not be too soon—Kosovo needs democratically elected representatives who can be held accountable. Only by participating in those elections can Kosovo's Serbs begin to reclaim their proper role.

The result of those elections is a foregone conclusion: Albanian parties committed to independence will win. But they need to understand that no change in the status of Kosovo is possible without a new UN Security Council resolution. The Russians and Chinese have their own reasons for not wanting any change. Only if Belgrade asks them will they abstain. So Kosovo's status depends ultimately on reaching an accommodation between Belgrade and Pristina. Chasing Serbs from their homes and mistreating other minorities will make it more difficult to reach such an accommodation.

*Macedonia.* Macedonia poses the starkest challenge to those who believe in democratic values and human rights. Albanian extremists are violently attacking the Macedonian state, they say in the name of Albanian rights. The Macedonian army and police have responded by trying to win a clear military victory. The way the fighting has been conducted has polarized the country's ethnic groups almost to the breaking point.

The risks to regional stability that Macedonia poses are enormous—its collapse would undermine US interests in Europe and beyond. If the guerillas in Macedonia are successful, it will inspire Serb and Albanian extremists in Kosovo and Serb and Croat extremists in Bosnia, destabilizing the entire region and putting US troops at risk.

The NATO-negotiated ceasefire is a major step forward. There is still time to pull Macedonia back from the brink by reaching a detailed political solution, though the recovery will be prolonged. Last month I outlined, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, specific steps that need to be taken to weaken the extremists, help the Macedonian government turn towards a political solution and unify the US government and international community efforts on behalf of Macedonia.

I am pleased to be able to report that important steps have been taken. KFOR is cracking down on guerilla supply lines in Kosovo. The Administration has issued an executive order that aims to end guerilla fundraising in the US. A US special envoy is helping the Macedonian government in its search for a political solution that will redress Albanian grievances. Europe and the US appear to be working in tandem, though the EU mediator should I believe also wear a NATO hat. We and our Allies must speak with one, powerful voice. There is no substitute for unity of command and purpose.

#### WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN FOR THE UNITED STATES?

First, it means that perseverance in the right direction brings results. While no one can be happy so long as Serbs are mistreated in Kosovo or extremist rebellion threatens Macedonia, the situation is dramatically improved from ten years ago, when nationalist leaderships bent on war found broad popular support. Better coordinated and concerted actions by Europe and the United States—with many other countries pitching in—are slowly making democracy, free markets and protection of human rights the main goals of most people in the Balkans.

Not everyone shares these goals, however. We and our European partners need to learn how better to defeat extremists and strengthen moderates. We did well to support the democratic opposition in Serbia and moderates in Bosnia. We are doing better in countering Croat and Serb extremists in Bosnia and in preventing arms and money from reaching Albanian extremists in Macedonia and Kosovo. If we enhance these efforts—for example by ensuring that the main indicted war criminals in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia are arrested and sent to The Hague—peaceful solutions will be easier to find.

It is especially hard to deal with nationalists ensconced in legitimate democratic governments and political parties. It must be made clear to all our friends that US assistance requires abandonment of hopes for Greater Serbia or Greater Albania as well as schemes for driving Albanians from parts of Macedonia. We should insist on concrete steps. Belgrade must reform its military—including retirement of those who commanded the army during Milosevic's wars—and end assistance to separatists in Bosnia and Kosovo. This will open the door for expanded cooperation between

NATO, the US and the Yugoslav Army, as well as lifting of the UN arms embargo. Kosovo Albanians must enter a dialogue with Belgrade on the question of missing people and end support for the guerrillas in Macedonia. Skopje must crack down on the misbehavior of its army and police forces, ending mistreatment of Albanian civilians and arresting reservists who have rioted against them. The Macedonian government has the right to defend itself against an armed insurgency, but not to conduct, or allow, a war against civilians.

Essential to any effort to defeat extremists is establishment of the rule of law. We can rebuild schools, return people home, provide loans to small enterprise, but lasting results require law and order. The problems we still face in the Balkans all involve criminal as well as political elements. Once Balkans ethnic problems are under control, I expect organized crime and trafficking of all sorts to remain. The US should, in my view, refocus a major portion of its assistance efforts to support for police and independent judiciaries. This is work we do well—we just haven't done enough of it.

The rule of law should be part of a broader effort to establish stronger states in the Balkans. Even without ethnic problems, Macedonia would have difficulties because it is a weak state—just like Albania, which suffered massive refugee outflows and internal violence without ethnic tension. Building up the Balkans states should primarily be a European responsibility, since it is essential for their relations with the EU. But the US should be prepared to contribute, if only because of its interest in combating criminality.

ARE US TROOPS STUCK IN THE BALKANS FOREVER? WILL THEY HAVE TO GO TO  
MACEDONIA?

If the international community can unify its own fragmented civilian efforts in Bosnia, I believe the situation there will permit over the next several years further drawdown of foreign military forces. There is no military threat in Bosnia today that Europeans cannot handle. The reason for US troops to remain is to reassure both Europeans and Bosnians that the US is not disengaging. That we should be able to do in other ways. The US should be making commitments to integrating the three Bosnian armies, unifying and strengthening international civilian implementation and providing it with an executive police force.


The same is not true in Kosovo. Only the US has the credibility with both Albanians and Serbs to ensure that the European-led force in Kosovo is able to stay on top of the situation. It will be some time before democratic institutions there are strong enough to counter criminality, political extremism and ethnic hatred. Some of my colleagues argue that US support for Kosovo independence would help to stabilize the situation there. I do not agree. It would instead strain our relations with our Allies and with Serbs and Macedonians. Kosovo cannot be governed from Belgrade, but the Security Council will remove the international protectorate only when Serbs believe that their legitimate interests will be protected. Until then, foreign forces will have to stay.

Are NATO, including US, troops going to be needed in Macedonia? The answer is "yes." Only NATO can disarm the guerillas, assuming a political solution is found. And NATO may well have to do more. It will be some time before the Macedonian army and police will be able to return to some parts of the country. International monitors, most likely from the OSCE, will be required. NATO, whose credibility depends on the participation of US forces, should rule out nothing and prepare for everything. European troops may lead the effort, but at the least US logistics and intelligence will be crucial.

What about sending in troops without an agreed political solution? A number of people are proposing that NATO move into Macedonia before the fighting makes the situation even more difficult. They note that imposed solutions proved necessary in Bosnia and in Kosovo. The problem is that NATO wants to fight neither the Albanian nor the Macedonian government forces. In addition, a forcible deployment of NATO into part of Macedonia could well lead to further ethnic division and even partition, precisely the opposite of what we would want. Our diplomacy should be vigorous, bringing to bear all the political, legal, military, and economic instruments at our disposal. But I do not see for the moment an alternative to a negotiated political solution.

The Balkans are not inherently a region of major US strategic interest. We are there because our absence would aggravate the situation and disrupt other strategic interests, including relations with our European Allies and with Russia as well as US and NATO credibility worldwide. There have been major improvements in the Balkans in the last five years. If we continue to turn Kosovo and Bosnia in the right direction and get Macedonia right, five years hence we could see a much reduced

US military commitment. The Balkans will then be on the road to Europe, where the region belongs.



Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Serwer.

We would like now to hear from Mr. James R. Hooper. Please proceed, Mr. Hooper.

I have a community in my district that looks like your name, only they insist on "Hooper." So I do not know if you prefer Hooper, but you tell me.

Mr. HOOPER. Hooper; it is an English/German background. I am curious whether Hooper is actually from Cornwall. I am sure the audience here is going to be fascinated by this. I am. [Laughter.]

Just out of curiosity, what is their background; do you know?

Mr. BEREUTER. They are mostly German. Go ahead.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES R. HOOPER, MANAGING DIRECTOR,  
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY GROUP**

Mr. HOOPER. Thank you. I really appreciate the chance to be here. If I may start out, and I will summarize my prepared testimony, but if I may, I will start out with something from the heart.

I am pleased to be here before Congress today, because of the role that you all played in getting Milosevic to the Hague. He would not be in the Tribunal, were it not for the conditionality legislation that was passed by the House and Senate, in a bipartisan fashion.

The previous Administration resisted that. I think this Administration has made good use of it, and it would not have happened without this effort, this initiative. It was a risk, you took it, and he is there because of what the Congress did, and the effort and the good use that the Administration made out of that.

I am proud to be here before you today in Congress, because of that, if for nothing else.

The message that I bring to you can be boiled down to one sentence: that the decade-long, U.S.-led effort to achieve sustainable peace in southeastern Europe is poised for significant further progress, but only if the United States maintains its leadership role and the momentum for change that this generates.

It would be presumptuous of me to provide a report card of the Bush Administration's efforts in southeastern Europe after only 6 months in office. So let us be presumptuous. Pessimists, including some in the Administration, critical of the U.S. investment in stabilizing southeastern Europe, have been trumped by the success of Serbia's democratic forces, their decisive transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal, and the impact that the newly-appointed U.S. Special Envoy has already had on the negotiating process in Macedonia.

A root cause of the Administration's hesitancy about the Balkans has been a preoccupation with letting force levels define policy. The military has perceived conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and even combat, as threats to readiness and budget planning. This negative agenda tends to drive policymaking.

The Administration, however, has already begun munching on its own words about disengaging from the Balkans. They are moving incrementally beyond treating the region as an arena for shifting American political-military burdens to the allies.

There are two reasons for the shift in policy. First, they have found, to their surprise, that engagement can succeed, bringing

them political credit and positive media attention, while also making the overall regional mission, and I think this is very important, seem that much more attainable and the burdens and sacrifices that the American people have supported justified, therefore.

This is what happened when the Administration used Congressionally-mandated legislation, applying assistance conditionalities to leverage the arrest and then the extradition of Milosevic.

The extradition of Milosevic sharply defines the two competing political visions in Serbia and the most effective Serbian partner for the West. The non-nationalist reformers, led by Serbian Republic Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, did all the heavy lifting to arrest and extradite Milosevic.

The devoutly nationalist Federal Yugoslav President, Vojislav Kostunica, revealed his lack of political integrity by publicly supporting the passage of an extradition law, while privately pressuring the Constitutional Court justices to block Milosevic's transfer.

The West should begin differentiating more effectively between Kostunica's anti-reformist policies and the efforts of the real reformers. If he judges it to be to his political advantage, and I believe that he does, Prime Minister Djindjic should be invited to Washington soon to meet the President and receive fresh promises of assistance.

Washington should also pay careful attention to Mr. Djindjic's skepticism about the future of the Milosevic-created rump Yugoslavia. Djindjic speaks for those Serbs who see the stabilizing effects of letting go of Montenegro in less than a year, and he has said so publicly.

The U.S. should respond by adopting a neutral stance on Montenegro's independence and the future of the FRY. The State Department should also stop withholding and delaying the U.S. assistance, in order to undermine Montenegrin President Djukanovic's independence effort.

U.S. aid should be used to leverage reforms, and the Serbs and Montenegrins allowed to decide on their own whether to stay together or part company.

The crisis in Macedonia has compelled the Administration to accelerate reconsideration of its Balkan policies. The crisis caught the Administration, and myself, by surprise.

As a testing ground for European leadership, moreover, 4 months of non-stop, European-led diplomacy found the National Liberation Army [the NLA] of Macedonian Albanian insurgents at the gates of the capital, and Macedonia's national unity government near collapse. A full-fledged civil war that might draw in neighboring states against their own better judgment, and our regional interests, seemed imminent.

What a difference an American special envoy can make. Within a week of dispatching Ambassador James Pardew to Macedonia, a NATO-brokered cease-fire was signed by the NLA and Macedonian army, and a U.S.-EU comprehensive framework plan was presented to Macedonian Slav and Macedonian Albanian political leaders.

NATO also announced support for deploying a force into Macedonia for a limited period to collect the weapons of the NLA, if a political agreement were to be reached.

We should not under-estimate the difficulty of the task before Special Envoy Pardew and his EU counterpart, Francois Leotard. They must find a formula that preserves the integrity of the Macedonian state and the rights of its Macedonian Slav majority, while ending the constitutional, legal, economic, and cultural discrimination against the ethnic Albanian minority, who constitute about one-third or perhaps more of the population.

Each side is convinced that the other wants to partition the country or create a federation of two ethnic entities.

The Albanians believe that only Western diplomatic intervention can salvage an agreement, placing their trust in the Americans, while privately disparaging the EU as anti-Albanian. Macedonian Slavs barely tolerate the diplomats, and criticize the whole concept of a diplomatically brokered agreement.

I am convinced that the ethnic Albanians, publicly perceived as seeking partition and union with Kosovo, are in fact more strongly committed to the concept of a joint state than many Macedonia Slav leaders.

The Albanians, however, should drop their demand for an ethnic veto. More challenging than reaching an agreement may be the task of overcoming reluctance by the Macedonian Slavs though to implement any agreed settlement. If that happens, the NLA will return, and conflict will ensue.

Pardew thus requires assistance from senior levels of the Administration, in particular the involvement of Secretary Powell, and a commitment by the Administration to participate in a NATO peace-keeping force, that would remain in Macedonia for an unspecified duration of time, beyond the 30-day disarming period now foreseen.

U.S. troops should operate beyond the logistics and support role in that peacekeeping force that Secretary Rumsfeld outlined Monday, for the 30 day disarming force.

A peace settlement in Macedonia, if it could be established, if it could be negotiated, would establish a precedent in the region; success at preventing conflict and preserving moderate options, rather than spending years to resuscitate the moderate political center after a war.

Every Administration talks about conflict prevention. It would be a breakthrough if the Bush Administration could achieve it.

Regarding Kosovo, after the November 17th parliamentary elections, Washington should first, help the new Kosovo leaders to expand their self-governing authority; second, announce that the U.S. will not support the return of Belgrade's authority to Kosovo; and third, seek international support for conditional self-determination that links independence to establishment of democracy, protection of minority rights, and acceptance of the current border with Macedonia.

Assuming Kosovo makes progress toward meeting these conditions, the Kosovars should be able to exercise their self-determination within 3 to 5 years, which would effectively mean independence.

Bosnia presents different challenges. With non-nationalists in the ascendancy in Serbia and Milosevic in the Hague, the West should clear the way to move beyond the Dayton Peace Accords by first, apprehending indicted Bosnian Serb war criminals, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic; second, insisting that Bosnia be treated both by its inhabitants and its neighbors as one country; third, removing ethnic vetoes, while granting the Bosnian Serbs and Croats considerable autonomy, and not impeding their cultural and commercial contacts with neighboring Serbia and Croatia; fourth, ending the farce of a tripartite and dysfunctional presidency by electing one President for the whole country; and fifth, providing security for all refugees who wish to return to their homes, to do so.

Finally, I would summarize by saying that momentum is building for major progress toward stabilizing southeastern Europe, if the Bush Administration uses active engagement to prevent further conflict and lock in democratic change.

The Administration, in my view, should first, accept that Europe lacks the political, military, and diplomatic capacity to resolve serious Balkan crises; second, stop defining policy goals in Bosnia or Kosovo as the transfer of political, military, and diplomatic responsibilities to Europe, and commit to establishing a peacekeeping force in Macedonia with U.S. troops. There has never been a peace agreement in the region that has not had a NATO peacekeeping force with there with U.S. troops.

Third, they should prepare to help manage the possible independence of Serbia and Montenegro; and last, harness the two great engines of potential Balkan stability and conflict, Serbian and Albanian nationalism, to democratization and economic recovery, through a massive economic assistance program for Serbia, a commitment to conditional independence for Kosovo, and a greater U.S. responsibility for brokering a Macedonia settlement that balances survival of the Macedonian state with full citizenship and economic participation for its ethnic Albanian Minority.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hooper follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES R. HOOPER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, PUBLIC  
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY GROUP

I appreciate the invitation to give testimony before the Committee today and welcome your continuing interest in Balkan peace efforts. The decade-long, U.S.-led effort to achieve sustainable peace in southeastern Europe is poised for significant further progress only if the U.S. maintains its leadership role and the momentum for change this generates. Congress can help support this process.

It would be presumptuous of me to provide a report card of the Bush administration's efforts in southeastern Europe after only six months in office. So, let's be presumptuous. Pessimists—including some in the administration—critical of the U.S. investment in stabilizing southeastern Europe have been trumped by the success of Serbia's democratic forces, their decisive transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague tribunal, and the impact that the newly appointed U.S. special envoy has already had on the negotiating process in Macedonia.

You recall the effort by senior officials to insert a European area code before the 911 international emergency number. That required, however, the collective amnesia of everyone who witnessed the consequences of European failures to broker Balkan peace settlements while U.S. coaches worked their playbooks on the sidelines. European politicians and diplomats are now the first to acknowledge that the real action begins when the U.S. quarterback takes the field and starts calling the plays.

A root cause of the administration's hesitation over what to do in the Balkans has been a preoccupation with letting force levels define policy. Led by the army, the U.S. military has perceived conflict prevention, peacekeeping and even combat as threats to readiness and budget planning. This negative agenda tends to drive policymaking and deserves more skepticism than it normally receives.

The first order of business, therefore, is to congratulate the administration for a willingness to begin munching on its own words regarding the marginal significance of the Balkans to U.S. interests. They are slowly, incrementally moving beyond the goal of treating the Balkans as an arena to shift American political-military burdens to the allies.

There are two reasons for the incremental shifts in the administration's Balkan policies. First, they have found that engagement can succeed, bringing them political credit and positive media attention, while also making the overall regional mission seem that much more attainable and the burdens and sacrifices of the American people justified.

The use of assistance conditionality to leverage the arrest and extradition of Milosevic has boosted the self-confidence of those in the administration who argue that American leadership can make a vital difference in stabilizing southeastern Europe. It helped that few in Washington—apart from you in Congress who legislated this tool into existence—expected it to work, that the previous administration had resisted conditionality legislation on their watch, and that the Europeans supposedly waiting to receive the handoff from Washington opposed conditionality and predicted that U.S. risk-taking would backfire.

The departure of Milosevic with little apparent damage to the reformers who removed him makes other U.S. objectives in the region seem attainable rather than unreachable and lends the weight of conviction to U.S. policy and leadership. It also defines the two competing political visions in Serbia and the most effective Serbian partner of the West. The non-nationalist reformers led by Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic did all the heavy lifting to arrest and then transfer Milosevic. The devoutly nationalist federal Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica revealed his lack of political integrity by publicly supporting the passage of an extradition law while privately pressuring the Constitutional Court to block Milosevic's transfer. Kostunica, with his nationalist dreams, legalisms, and Milosevic-era supporters, will remain a threat to the reform effort for the indefinite future.

If Djindjic judges it to be to his advantage in Serbia, he should be invited to Washington soon to meet the president, be treated as a reliable democratic partner, receive fresh promises of assistance, and take that walk in the Rose Garden that can enhance the aura of statesmanship of foreign leaders. I hope he would be well received in Congress as well.

Washington should listen carefully to Djindjic's views about the future of Yugoslavia. He speaks for those Serbs who see the stabilizing effects of possibly letting go of Montenegro by the end of this year. The U.S. should discard a policy inherited from the Milosevic era and adopt a neutral stance on the independence of Montenegro and the future of the Milosevic-created Yugoslav federation.

If the Milosevic breakthrough was a carrot to the administration to rethink its Balkan policies, the crisis in Macedonia has been the stick. Precipitated in February, and not anticipated by any Balkans experts, myself included, the crisis caught the administration with its disengagement showing and no basis for blaming the problem on its predecessors. As a testing ground for European leadership, moreover, four months of non-stop, European-led diplomacy resulted in the National Liberation Army (NLA) of Macedonian Albanian fighters at the gates of the capital and Macedonia's national unity government near collapse. A full-fledged civil war that might draw in neighboring states against their own better judgment and our interests seemed imminent.

What a difference an American special envoy can make. When the administration belatedly responded to the gravity of the crisis by dispatching Ambassador James Pardew, one of the most talented professionals in the State Department, to Macedonia, the diplomatic tempo changed almost overnight. Within a week a NATO-brokered ceasefire was signed by the NLA and Macedonian army and, in coordination with the European special envoy, former French defense minister Francois Leotard, a U.S.-EU comprehensive framework plan was presented to Macedonian Slav and Albanian political leaders. NATO also announced support for deploying a force into Macedonia for a limited period to receive the weapons of the NLA once a political agreement had been reached.

We should not underestimate the difficulty of the task before Pardew and Leotard. They must find a formula that preserves the integrity of the Macedonian state and the rights of its Macedonian Slav majority while ending constitutional, legal, economic and cultural discrimination against its ethnic Albanian minority, who con-

stitute about one-third of the population. Restoring comity between the two communities will not be easy: each side is convinced that the other wants to partition the country or create a federation of two ethnic entities. The Albanians believe that only Western diplomatic intervention can salvage an agreement, placing their trust in the Americans while privately disparaging the EU as anti-Albanian. Macedonian Slavs barely tolerate the diplomats and criticize the whole concept of a diplomatically brokered agreement. The level of rage among Macedonian Slavs boiled over two weeks ago into an attack on parliament, the government and Western diplomats.

My own view is that the ethnic Albanians, publicly perceived as seeking partition and union with Kosovo, are in fact more strongly committed to the concept of a joint state than some Macedonian Slav leaders, who continue to prepare public opinion for the implications of various leaked partition maps. Perceptions will change, however, and the negotiations move into high gear only when the Albanians drop their demand for an ethnic veto. Neither Macedonian Albanians, Kosovo Serbs nor Bosnian Serbs should have an ethnic veto, which I oppose in principle anywhere in the Balkans.

But the most difficult challenge to surmount may be assuring implementation of a settlement rather than reaching agreement itself. The Macedonian Slavs may sign a brokered peace agreement and decide later how much of it they want to implement. If agreement is reached and the diplomats depart after toasting their success rather than stay to monitor the follow through, words on paper will likely not be translated into deeds in practice, the NLA will return, and conflict will ensue.

Paradev thus requires more than incremental changes in American policy. He needs active help from senior political levels of the administration, in particular the involvement of Secretary Powell as appropriate and a commitment by the administration to participate in a NATO peacekeeping force that would remain in Macedonia for an unspecified duration of time beyond the 30-day disarming period now foreseen. U.S. troops should operate beyond the logistics and support role that Secretary Rumsfeld outlined Monday.

You in Congress and on the Committee, we in the NGO community, and the American people have much riding on the outcome of crisis diplomacy in Macedonia. Negotiating and implementing an agreement would establish a precedent in the region—success at preventing conflict and preserving moderate options, rather than dealing with the consequences of conflict and spending years to resuscitate the moderate political center. Every administration talks about conflict prevention, but it would be an enormous advance if the Bush administration could actually achieve it.

This still leaves us with Bosnia and Kosovo. In Kosovo, the administrations will have elected partners to work with following the November 17 parliamentary elections. Washington should deal constructively with the new Kosovo leaders as they seek to establish and expand their self-governing authority. To build on the momentum of electoral progress, Washington should announce that the U.S. will not support the return of Belgrade's authority to Kosovo, and will seek international support for conditional self-determination that links independence to establishment of genuine democracy, minority rights, and acceptance of the current border with Macedonia. Assuming that Kosovo makes progress toward meeting these conditions, the Kosovars should be able to exercise their self-determination within three more years, which would effectively mean independence.

Bosnia presents different challenges. Belgrade's courageous and principled decision to extradite Milosevic has been followed by statements from Bosnian Serb officials that it is time for them to move against Bosnian Serb indictees. The West can either treat Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and the other Bosnian Serb indictees as ripe fruit that will fall off the tree of their own accord, thereby requiring no extra effort or risk by SFOR, or help the Belgrade reformers and Bosnian Serb moderates by apprehending them. My own view is that the West should apprehend these two leading indictees—Mladic, after all, is reportedly hiding out in the American-patrolled zone of Bosnia.

The ascendancy of non-nationalist democratic forces in Serbia also means that the West can finally begin to move beyond the Dayton peace accords. Dayton ended the Bosnian conflict but produced an agreement that gave the Bosnian Serbs an ethnic veto and enabled them to act virtually as a separate entity. It is time to make Bosnia one country again, end the farce of a tripartite and dysfunctional presidency, remove ethnic vetoes, and return all refugees to their original homes should they wish to do so.

Establishment of a Bosnia whole, free and integrated into Europe on that basis will require Western steadiness of nerve and finesse. This is not the time to be cutting back on U.S. forces there. The Bosnian Serbs will have to accept that their po-

litical future lies in Bosnia, but that their cultural and commercial links to Serbia can be maintained. The Bosnian Croats will need firm oversight and management. Nationalists in Croatia lately seem determined to win back some of the political ground they have lost, and ethnic Croat nationalists on both sides of the Bosnian-Croatian border often work together to further their anti-democratic causes.

In conclusion, I suggest that the timing is right and momentum is building for major progress toward stabilizing southeastern Europe, if the Bush administration uses active engagement to prevent further conflict, lock in democratic change, and be prepared to help manage the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. The administration should accept that Europe is capable of acting as a somewhat more effective partner of the U.S. but lacks the capacity for taking the lead politically, militarily or diplomatically to resolve serious regional crises, nor is it in our interests to let them prove that point, as almost happened in Macedonia. Since no Balkan peace settlement has worked without the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops, Washington should apply that practice to Macedonia and stop discussing policy goals in Bosnia or Kosovo solely in terms of trimming U.S. force levels.

The ultimate success of U.S. policy in southeastern Europe will be determined by the ability of the transatlantic community to harness the two great engines of potential Balkan stability and conflict—Serbian and Albanian nationalism—to democratization and economic recovery. This will require a massive economic assistance program for Serbia implemented with some urgency, a commitment to conditional independence for Kosovo, and greater U.S. responsibility for brokering a Macedonian settlement that balances the survival of the Macedonian state with full citizenship and economic participation for its ethnic Albanian minority.

Mr. GALLEGLY [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Hooper.

Dr. Serwer, do you give any credence to those who warn that no matter what is finally agreed to in Macedonia, the extremists will find fault, will not endorse it, and that no concessions on education, language, culture, or promise of government jobs will buy off those whose agenda is to ensure that no Albanian will ever have to live under the Slav majority government? Do you think there is anything to be said about that?

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to predict exactly how individuals whom we do not know and who are obviously extremists, and who are trying to use violence to achieve political ends will react to political agreements.

That said, I think we should anticipate that there will be some such rejectionists. The experience in the Balkans is that they have always been there, and because there are weak states, it is extremely difficult to contain the damage that those very few extremists can do.

Even today, the number of people actively engaged in rebellion in Macedonia is not enormous. The problem is that the Macedonia state is ill-equipped to deal with them. We have to anticipate that even after a political solution is found, there might be some who will reject it. But that is one of the reasons that we need a NATO peacekeeping force.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Hooper, you seem to be advocating independence for Kosovo. Do you have the same advocacy for Montenegro?

Mr. HOOPER. I am advocating conditional independence for Kosovo, if they meet the three conditions I mentioned.

For Montenegro, yes, I believe they should be allowed to determine this themselves, without the United States taking the position that it has up until now, of opposing Montenegrin independence, and using the assistance program to try to leverage the anti-independence vote in Montenegro.

Again, Serb reformers have concluded themselves that Montenegro may be an albatross around their neck, for their own rea-

sons. Mr. Djindjic's view is that half of the Montenegrins, at least, want independence already; that is those who are supportive of President Djukanovic; and a little less than half seem to want to the return of Mr. Milosevic.

Either way, it causes problems for Belgrade, and it causes problems for the reform effort. It was the pro-Milosevic Montenegrins who blocked the passage of the extradition law in the Federal Parliament, and actually forced the hand of Mr. Djindjic at the Serbian Republic level, either to allow legalisms and red tape to keep Mr. Milosevic in Serbia, in jail; or to make a decisive move, cut the Gordian knot, and get him out, so that the international community would be prepared to treat Serbia more seriously at the donor conference than it was going to, that was meeting in Europe the next day.

It was the SMP, the political party, that is the pro-Milosevic party from Montenegro, that was blocking this in the Federal Parliament.

I think they saw their reform, as it was, life's darkest moment. Western money was going to be jeopardized, because the United States perhaps would not participate in the donor's conference, and it was the Montenegrins that were causing the problems, as well as President Kostunica, himself.

They just, again, for these reasons, decided that it is no longer in their interests to keep Montenegro in, if it does not want to participate as a full, serious member of Yugoslavia.

So I think that is the interesting development there. I think we should take a neutral position, and let them work it out themselves; rather than trying to block it.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Maybe I will throw this out to both of you, and either one or both may want to answer this. You both speak rather optimistically about the region, perhaps with the exception of Macedonia.

However, in a recent international crisis group paper on Bosnia, the author wrote, and I quote,

“Any significant cuts in SFOR levels now would strengthen Bosnia's hardliners, and would encourage extremists. It would undermine security and would sway electoral support behind the extremists.”

It sounds to me like all three sides are ready to go back to fighting. Do you agree with that assessment; and if so, what does that really say about what we have accomplished in the last 5½ years; and does it really suggest any substantial progress has been made with respect to the root causes of the conflict in the first place?

It looks like Mr. Hooper is anxious to give that one a shot.

Mr. HOOPER. Well, I will give a shot at it, and then Dan might want to, as well.

I think this is part of the problem. The Administration came in and began talking about redefining its approach to the Balkans, on the basis of what American troop levels were going to be, and the presumption that the burdens and responsibilities of conflict prevention and peacemaking in the region could be handed-off to the Europeans.

What we then began to see happening was that the extremists in the Bosnia Croat community, I think, within this atmosphere of talk about American disengagement, began to begin to become more obstreperous.

The problems developed in Macedonia, as well, and you are not cutting fat out any more in the SFOR force in Bosnia. With any troops that are cut right now, in my view, you are cutting into the bone. You need them there.

But you could get them out quicker if you would use these troops to at least arrest the indicted war criminals, particularly Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic.

The fact that they have not been arrested is a signal to the hardliners in the Bosnian Serb community that if you do not compromise, if you remain inflexible and true to your nationalist principles, that you can outlast the West, that they will get tired, they will go home. Then we will have our separate state. We will be able to detach it from Bosnia and either link it up with Serbia, or become independent.

I think we would send a very strong message, and we would be able to move the troops out quicker, if we would actually get on with the job of completing the mission, by arresting the war criminals, and in particular, getting the refugees back.

This is going to take risks. This will involve risks. There could be, and I am not trying to sell you something here, and tell you it is risk-free. If we want the benefits of American power in the region, the deployment of American power, I think we have to understand the consequences.

But the avoidance of risk in Bosnia, by the United States, in terms of the arrest of the war criminals and moving the refugees back, means that the overhang of war is going to be there. The hardliners are going to stay in the woodwork, and it just means that the duration of our mission is going to last and last and last. Maybe Dan has a different perspective.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Let me just kind of respond to your comments, and I do not disagree with much of what you had to say, as it relates to bringing these people to justice, if you will.

I think the first major step has taken place with Mr. Milosevic being in custody. I think it is absolutely critical that the next tier be brought to justice as a part of the stabilization, and I agree with that totally. We had meetings this morning on that, and it seems like we are all on the same page there.

But the issue of time, and for those of us that debated this issue some almost 6 years ago, the question was, do we have a defined mission, and do we have an exit policy?

The answer was, really, there was not an answer. But the former Administration said, we will be in and out of there in 6 months. In fact, I remember General Shalikashvili, and I guess he was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that time.

He said, a year, at most. None of us really believed that, because it really is difficult, without a very specific, defined mission. Like in the Gulf, our mission was to liberate Kuwait, and not go beyond that. But they are not the same situations.

So there are a lot of folks that are concerned about the fact that we still have a lot of young men and women there, and the fact

that perhaps Europe is not really living up to their responsibility in their own backyard, as it relates to the role they play.

But I have to be very candid, I do not know how we are going to just leave, until we do feel a strong sense of stabilization, and that is not going to happen until many others come to justice, beyond Mr. Milosevic.

Mr. HOOPER. I agree with that, and let me quickly say something, because I am sure Dan would like to add something. That is that it really needs to be focused on mission completion.

Why should we be in such a hurry to pull troops out of Bosnia or Kosovo, if that is under discussion, or be resistant to putting them into Macedonia, if there is a real mission, and they can make a difference, when we have got troops in Germany? The Soviet Union is no longer there. I realize that things may loom on the horizon, but much of the mission has been accomplished, yet they are still there.

A friend of mine likes to raise this with me, but the same kind of standard is not even being applied to the same continent. The Russians are not coming across the gap any more and through Poland.

But there are real uses that can be made of small numbers of American troops in the Balkans. They make the difference. That is who people look to for leadership. They know that when our troops are there, we are engaged.

The Administration can try to put a European area code before the 911 emergency number, but the trouble is, the Europeans are not capable of answering it, when the call comes in, and you need people that are going to call Europe, rather than the "202" area code for Washington. Then Europe and the Balkans, they are all going to call "202."

Mr. GALLEGLY. Well, I want to give Dr. Serwer a chance, but I have to get back to what my original understanding of our initial mission was. That was to stop the war.

It appears that we have gone now to a different mission, which is stabilizing the environment. The only way that is going to come to pass, it appears, is only after we bring more people to justice at the second or maybe third tier.

But really, how big a role should the United States play, beyond stopping the war? Is not the European community capable of playing that role of the stabilization?

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Chairman, can I say a few words about this issue, and your original question about whether they go back to war?

Mr. GALLEGLY. By all means, but I would like you to come back to that.

Mr. SERWER. I do not entirely share Jim's disillusion with the Europeans and what they are capable of. I think they need American leadership. But I do think Europe has tremendous capacities, tremendous resources at its disposal, and the state building process should largely be a European state building process, because these countries are going to end up in Europe, not in the United States.

So I sympathize with those who want to shift a good part of the burden. I would only point out to them that a very large part of the burden is already in European hands, and that the Europeans

in Macedonia, though not instantly successful, have tried to play a very positive role, and have been much better than they were in Bosnia, it seems to me.

Let me go back to your question about will these people fight again, because I think this deserves some attention. There is only one really viable army on the ground in Bosnia today, in my view, that is the Bosnian army.

The HVO, the Croat force or component, as it is known today in the Federation army is not, by itself, a viable fighting force. It was viable during the war in Bosnia solely because of support from the Croatian army, and it has deteriorated since then.

The Bosnian Serb army has deteriorated a great deal, and can expect diminishing help from Belgrade. I wish I could say it could expect no help from Belgrade, but I am afraid there is still some assistance.

We have allowed, however, these structures to remain as they were 5 years ago, when there was a war going on; and Dayton, in some sense, froze in place these structures, the military structures, and even the entity structure of Bosnia is a structure that reflects the warring parties of 6 years ago.

It seems to me that the time has come to go beyond that. By going beyond that, I mean very specific things: integration of the armies, the time has come, at the very least, at the command level. These armies have to begin to think about the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not about the defense of their ethnic groups.

The intelligent services should be abolished, and a new intelligence service built, that will think about the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Now these things go beyond Dayton, and you may say to me, why can the Europeans not handle that after the Americans have left? I think the short answer is that they will not be able to do that, and that getting out requires that these things be done first, and especially in the military area, having trained and equipped the Federation Army, the United States has a particular responsibility.

But you are absolutely right to be impatient. Do not get me wrong. The problem is now that we have to think our way past Dayton, to a truly unified Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I truly appreciate your comments as it relates to patience. But I am kind of a pragmatic kind of person, and I am having trouble defining the word "patience." Because we have gone a long ways from 6 months to now 5½, and I am not advocating that we just pack up and leave, because we have an investment there, and there has been success.

But again, there is going to come a time, and hopefully sooner rather than later, where we are going to see that the European community is the one that is going to be responsible for the oversight of the stabilization.

Now the process that we talked about, as it relates to bringing others to justice, I personally am confident that Mr. Milosevic will probably rot in jail. I really believe that he has already resolved that in his own mind, if he is capable of resolving things like that in his mind. I believe that that is the case.

But it is going to take those other tiers, and I think that is going to come sooner rather than later. But at what point, and I know you cannot give me an hour or a date or whatever; but are we talking about months or are we talking about years here?

Mr. SERWER. We are talking about years, Mr. Chairman. We are not talking about months.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Are we talking about years, or are we talking about decades?

Mr. SERWER. We are talking about years, and a number lower than five, I would say.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Well, if 5½ today is, in relation to what 6 months was, 5 years ago, I hope that your numbers are more accurate than some of our leaders in the past.

Mr. SERWER. But Mr. Chairman, the 6 months, the 1 year, this was not serious.

Mr. GALLEGLY. We know that. It sounds like a speech I gave on the Floor, 5 or 6 years ago.

Mr. SERWER. It never was serious.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank both of you.

Mr. Hilliard, did you have anything to wrap up?

Mr. HOOPER. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I really appreciate your patience. I know this has been a long afternoon. Unfortunately, we do not have the control of the voting on the Floor, and I know it has been a long day for you.

Your testimony is important. This is an issue that I am quite sure we will be visiting with you in the future months, if not years, and I value your participation this afternoon. Thank you for both being here.

Mr. HOOPER. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The Committee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

